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The effects of delay on subjective reward value is referred to as temporal or delay 
discounting, as the value of the reward is discounted as a result of a delay to the reward’s 
presentation.  One way to measure the subjective value of delayed rewards is by 
assessing choice.  In examining temporal discounting, choice trials are presented between 
small immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards.  Procedures that reverse choice 
responding from smaller immediate rewards to larger delayed rewards are important to 
teaching an organism to tolerate delayed reinforcement.  Teaching children to make 
adaptive choices such as compliance, completing assigned tasks, and making functional 
requests involves teaching them to forgo engaging in behaviors that result in small sooner 
outcomes in favor of those resulting in larger later outcomes. Behavioral procedures to 
teach delay-to-reinforcement have produced positive outcomes but are not well 
established in the current body of literature.  Thus, there are limited standardized 
procedures and treatment options available to teach children to choose delayed rewards.  
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, a literature review was conducted to identify 
teaching procedures that have been investigated to increase choice allocation to larger 
later rewards over smaller sooner rewards and compare methods employed across studies.  
Second, a novel method to teach delay-to-reinforcement tolerance was investigated with 
six typically developing young children (ages 4 to 5-years).  This novel method, called a 
shifting delay procedure, involved closely manipulating the amount of the larger delayed 
reward by splitting it into both an immediate and delayed portion, and then gradually 
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shifting the immediate portion to the delayed portion.  Two participants were not exposed 
to treatment as baseline patterns of choice responding indicated consistent choice 
allocation for larger delayed rewards.  The remaining four participants were exposed to 
treatment.  For two of the four participants, choice was shifted from the smaller sooner 
reward to the larger later reward.  For the remaining two participants, treatment was 
ineffective in shifting choice allocation.  These findings are discussed as well as 
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Organisms, both human and nonhuman, tend to choose more immediate rewards 
over delayed rewards when those rewards are otherwise objectively equivalent (Mischel 
& Grusec, 1967; Myerson & Green, 1995).  This can be conceptualized as a concurrent 
schedule of reinforcement.  When a choice is available between two rewards that are 
equal in actual or objective value but differ in terms of immediacy of delivery, organisms 
tend to allocate a greater proportion of responses to the immediate stimulus over the 
delayed (Cooper, Heward, & Heron, 2006).  For example, if an individual is 
simultaneously presented with the choice of $100 immediately or $100 in one month, the 
individual can make a choice for either reward.  In general, it is more likely that the 
individual will allocate a higher proportion of responses to the $100 immediately.  Thus, 
the perceived or subjective values of the two $100 options differ with the value of the 
second $100 decreasing as a function of the delay.  This is explained by Critchfield and 
Kollins (2001) as the “weakening of consequence effects due to delay” (p. 102) and 
referred to as temporal or delay discounting. The subjective value of the reward is 
discounted as a result of a delay to the reward’s presentation.  
This same discounting effect is demonstrated when the delayed reward also 
differs in objective value (Myerson & Green, 1995).  When choices are available between 
rewards that differ in both immediacy and objective value, it is not as clear how 
organisms are likely to allocate choices for either reward.  For example, if an individual 
is simultaneously presented with the choice of $100 immediately or $1,000 in one month, 
the individual can make a choice for either reward.  The subjective values of the two 
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options, $100 versus $1,000, differ with the value of the $1,000 decreasing as a function 
of the delay. In this example however, it is unclear how the diminished subjective value 
of the $1,000 compares to the $100 because the rewards also differ in objective value.  
One way to measure the subjective value of delayed rewards is by assessing 
choice (Odum, 2011).  In examining delay discounting, choice trials are presented 
between small immediate rewards (typically referred to as smaller sooner rewards or 
SSR) and larger delayed rewards (typically referred to as larger later rewards or LLR) 
across a range of manipulations in delay to the LLR and amount of the SSR (Critchfield 
& Kollins, 2001).  For example, individuals might be asked to make repeated choices 
between a range of SSR values (e.g., $0, $100, $300, $500, $800, $1,000) delivered 
immediately and a constant LLR ($1,000) delivered after a range of delays (e.g., 1 week, 
1 month, 1 year, 10 years) (see Table 1).  Each SSR is paired with every delay for the 
LLR.  For example, individuals are asked to choose between $800 now versus $1,000 
after waiting 1 month.  
After a series of choice trials, indifference points are identified.  An indifference 
point is determined for each delay when a series of consistent choices (i.e., choice 
responding) for the LLR is reversed to the SSR during ascending choice sequences and 
vice versa for descending sequences.  The magnitude of the SSR at the indifference point 
is referred to as the subjective value of the LLR.  For example, Table 1 illustrates an 
indifference point identified at one month when a choice between $500 immediately 
versus $1,000 in one year reverses choice responding from the LLR to the SSR.  Thus, 
the subjective value of the LLR is $500.  Indifference points identified at each successive 







Each successive delay should show a lower subjective value of the LLR than the 
previous resulting in a decreasing trend (Reed & Martens, 2011).  For example, Tables 1 
and 2 demonstrate decreasing trends in subjective value of LLR across increasing delays.  
How steeply an individual discounts delayed rewards is relative to how immediately 
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choice responding reverses from the LLR to the SSR in ascending choice sequences.  For 
example, indifference points are labeled with an asterisk in Table 1 identifying subjective 
values of $1,000, $800, $500, and $300.  The decreasing trend across these subjective 
values demonstrates a discounting effect.  Table 2 represents data that demonstrates a 
larger or heavier discounting effect because choice responding reversed from the LLR to 
the SSR at much lower reward magnitude across delays.  Indifference points are labeled 
with an asterisk in Table 2 identifying subjective values of $500, $300, $100, and $0.  
The decreasing trend across these subjective values demonstrates a heavier discounting 
effect compared to the effect demonstrated by the data in Table 1.  The degree to which 
an individual discounts delayed rewards when presented with a series of choice trials has 
been related to the degree to which an individual discounts larger but delayed rewards in 
daily life (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Hoerger & Mace, 2006).   
 Temporal discounting procedures are a potentially useful tool in identifying 
impulsive behavior.  Impulsivity is typically assessed by indirect assessment measures 
such as rating scales that rely on subjective report.  The investigation of temporal 
discounting procedures has facilitated the objective measurement of impulsive behavior 
which is incompatible with the behavior of self-control.  Some behavior analytic 
researchers have operationally defined “impulsive” behavior as choices for SSR, and 
“self-control” as choices for LLR (Ainslie, 1974; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001; Rachlin & 
Green, 1972).  That is, a pattern of choice responding for SSR indicates that an individual 
engages in impulsive behavior, while a pattern of choice responding for LLR indicates 
self-control.   
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 Consistent with conventional behavioral observations that behavior is determined 
by past consequences (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001), different histories of impulsive 
behavior have been related to discounting the value of delayed rewards more heavily 
(Lane, Cherek, Rhoades, Pietras, & Tcheremissine, 2003; Mazur & Logue, 1978).  For 
example, one student may engage in off-task behaviors such as talking to peers instead of 
completing independent work.  Off-task behavior may result in immediate peer attention, 
yet the larger delayed outcome of earning a good grade is potentially sacrificed.  A 
second student may choose to forgo talking with peers to receive a good grade.  In this 
example, the value of the good grade is subjectively valued differently by the two 
students.  The first student discounts the value of the delayed reward (good grade) more 
heavily than the second student.  An extensive learning history of engaging in impulsive 
behavior may lead to more serious maladaptive behavior over time. 
Impulsivity has been correlated to more extreme maladaptive behaviors such as 
eating disorders, substance abuse, low academic success, and even suicide (Daugherty & 
Brase, 2010; Kirby, Winston, & Santiesteban, 2005; Liu et al., 2013).  It is also a core 
diagnostic criterion across a range of diagnoses such as attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), conduct disorder, and bipolar disorder (Broos et al., 2012; Moeller, 
Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001).  Additionally, impulsive behaviors 
reported in childhood have also been linked to negative outcomes later in life.  For 
example, Sihvola et al. (2011) reported that behaviors associated with impulsivity in 
younger years were significant predictors for substance abuse in adolescence.  Thus, the 
identification and treatment of impulsive choice responding may be critical at earlier 
ages.  
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Young children tend to choose SSR when offered concurrently with LLR 
(Forzano & Logue, 1995; Logue & Chavarro, 1992).  For example, young children in a 
study conducted by Vollmer, Borrero, Lalli, and Daniel (1999) engaged in aggressive 
behavior maintained by access to food and activities.  The study demonstrated that even 
after various manipulations such as differential reinforcement of alternative behavior 
procedures were implemented, aggression occurred when it resulted in SSR even though 
the alternative behavior resulted in LLR.  Research has been conducted to investigate the 
possibility of teaching individuals to make choices for LLR that are more advantageous 
in time (Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  Teaching children to make adaptive 
choices such as compliance, completing assigned tasks, and making functional requests 
involves teaching them to forgo engaging in behaviors that result in small sooner rewards 
in favor of those resulting in larger later rewards (Stromer, McComas, & Rehfeldt, 2000).  
Despite an evident need, there are few studies investigating procedures available to teach 
children to choose delayed rewards (Binder, Dixon & Ghezzi, 2000). 
The most widely investigated procedures to teach LLR choice responding to 
children include concurrent activities (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972), 
progressive delay schedule of reinforcement (e.g., Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988), 
and a combination of the two procedures (e.g., Dixon & Cummings, 2001).  A concurrent 
activity may be described as a “distracting activity” during the delay (Binder et al., 2000, 
p. 233).  For example, concurrent activities used in recent studies have included verbal 
and nonverbal activities.  Participants have been instructed to engage in verbal concurrent 
activities such as repetitiously reciting rules related to choosing the LLR or naming 
objects on flashcards (Binder et al., 2000).  Nonverbal concurrent activities have included 
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placing foam cubes in a plastic basket (Dixon, Rehfeldt, & Randich, 2003) or physical 
therapy exercises (e.g., Dixon & Falcomata, 2004).  
Progressive delay procedures involve presentation of both the large and small 
rewards immediately.  Delivery of the larger reward is delayed gradually over time 
(Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  For example, progressive delay procedures begin 
with the presentation of both choice options at 0 s and the delay associated with the larger 
later reward increases by increments (e.g., 5 s) each time a predetermined criterion is 
reached (Binder et al., 2000; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  Dixon and Cummings 
(2001) as well as Binder et al. (2000) investigated a combination of concurrent activities 
and progressive delay procedures with positive results.  
Further strategies considered to be possible treatments to increase LLR choice 
responding are commitment and rules.  Advance commitment to choose a larger delayed 
reward has been primarily investigated in nonhuman research (Ainslie, 1974; Rachlin & 
Green, 1972).  Commitment is described by Rachlin and Green (1972) as strategies that 
an organism engages in to make a predetermined choice allocation.  The predetermined 
commitment to a particular choice response renders the alternative option irrelevant 
(Rachlin & Green, 1972).  Although this is a strategy found in basic literature (Perrin & 
Neef, 2012), authors such as Rachlin and Green (1972) propose that commitment may 
explain concurrent activities self-imposed by children such as singing or counting during 
a delay.  An additional strategy to promote delay-to-reinforcement tolerance in children is 
rule delivery (Abikoff & Gittelman, 1985).  The strategy involves the delivery of a rule 
by another (e.g., experimenter) or reciting rules to oneself (Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 
1988) and has been described as “verbalizations that cue, direct, or maintain behavior” 
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(Friedling & O’Leary, 1979).  As Binder et al. (2000) discussed, there is a limited 
empirical basis and procedures available to teach children to choose delayed rewards. 
Purpose of the Study 
 Further investigation and development of procedures to teach children to choose 
larger delayed rewards is necessary for two reasons.  First, there are few studies that 
investigate procedures to teach children to choose LLR, which, in turn, results in a lack of 
empirically based strategies to choose from when teaching individuals to tolerate delay-
to-reinforcement.  Second, although progressive delay and concurrent activities are 
supported by the literature, it is critical that multiple treatment options are available.  
Individualized treatment should be expected for all socially significant behaviors, and a 
variety of treatment options may be necessary to maximize effectiveness at the individual 
level.  To meet these ends, a novel method to teach delay-to-reinforcement tolerance in 
young children was investigated.  This novel method, called a shifting delay procedure, 
involved splitting the larger delayed reward into both an immediate and delayed reward, 
and then gradually shifting the immediate portion to the delayed portion.  The purpose of 
this paper is two-fold.  First, a literature review was conducted to identify teaching 
procedures that have been investigated to increase choice allocation to larger later 
rewards over smaller sooner rewards and compare methods employed across studies.  
Second, the effects of a shifting delay procedure on choice allocation to SSR versus LLR 
was investigated with six typically developing young children (ages 4 to 5-years).  







The social significance of addressing impulsivity has been well-established 
considering its correlation to a variety of maladaptive behaviors.  In children, impulsivity 
is typically characterized by behaviors such as blurting out answers to questions or 
cutting to the front of the line.  In adolescence and young adults, impulsivity may be 
characterized by behaviors such as tobacco use or reckless driving, and by similar 
manifestations in adults such as gambling or reckless sexual behavior.  A lack of 
“impulse control” can affect social relationships, school or career success, and lead to 
more harmful behaviors such as aggression, substance abuse, eating disorders, and 
suicide (Daugherty & Brase, 2010; Kirby et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2013). 
Impulsivity has traditionally been identified via indirect assessment methods.  
Measures such as Likert scales, questionnaires, and rating scales are used to gather 
information from the target individual as well as others familiar with the target individual 
(e.g., caregivers, teachers).  For example, an item on a self-report measure might include 
“I act on impulse” (Moeller et al., 2001).  The target individual might be expected to rate 
his/her degree of impulsivity on a scale from 1 to 5.  Thus, the identification and 
subsequent treatment of impulsivity is based on patterns of reported behavior that are 
inferred by researchers and practitioners.  
There are significant limitations associated with relying on indirect assessment 
methods to identify behavior and design treatment.  Target behaviors are not directly 
measured, instead, verbal report is measured and may not have any relationship to actual 
behavior.  The problem with subjective and possibly biased verbal report is that the data 
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may not yield an accurate representation of true levels of behavior.  Thus, indirect 
assessment methods may result in unreliable and invalid data (Cooper et al., 2006).  An 
alternate and more accurate method of measuring behavior is direct assessment. 
Direct measurement of behavior such as rate, duration, or latency relies on direct 
observation and is used to measure actual behavior.  A precise definition is formulated 
that allows for direct observation of the actual behavior  potentially providing more 
accurate and precise information about the target behavior.  Reliable and accurate data is 
the keystone in the design of effective treatment.  
Behavior analysts have targeted “impulsivity” via direct assessment methods.  
Each instance of impulsive behavior may be conceptualized as a choice made for a less 
favorable but more immediate consequence (SSR) over a more favorable but delayed 
consequence (LLR).  When an individual demonstrates a pattern of allocating choices to 
SSR over LLR, behavior analysts identify such a pattern as impulsivity.  Thus, behavior 
analysts have assessed impulsivity by observing response patterns of choice allocation to 
reinforcers on concurrent schedules of reinforcement.  That is, when two reinforcers are 
simultaneously presented, they are in direct competition and reinforcer effects for one 
response are partially dependent on reinforcers available for other responses (Fisher & 
Mazur, 1997; Martens, Lochner, & Kelly, 1992).  This is true in the contexts of daily life.  
For example, a college student can choose to study to increase the possibility of earning a 
good grade.  The value of the good grade may be a powerful reinforcer when reinforcers 
are not simultaneously available for other responses.  However, if a good grade is in 
direct competition with reinforcers for alternate responses such as watching television 
then the value of the good grade is likely weakened.  
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Tasks investigating the weakening of consequence effects typically alter more 
than one reinforcer dimension at one time (Cuvo, Lerch, Leurquin, Gaffaney, & Poppen, 
1998).  For example, a young boy may be expected to endure delays for larger rewards 
such as waiting his turn for a toy.  Engaging in impulsive behavior such as grabbing a toy 
from a peer may result in immediate access to a toy; however, it is likely that the access 
is limited when a teacher intervenes or the peer takes the toy back.  Waiting for his turn 
to play with the toy may result in a larger amount of time with the toy after tolerating the 
delay to his turn.  In this example, each response results in consequences that differ in 
both magnitude and immediacy.  Grabbing the toy from the peer would be considered an 
impulsive choice for a smaller immediate gain while waiting his turn would be 
considered demonstrating self-control for the more favorable delayed outcome.  
Considering the effects that reinforcer dimensions such as immediacy and 
magnitude have on behavior may be useful in the development of interventions to alter 
impulsive patterns of choice responding (Neef & Lutz, 2001).  For example, teaching an 
individual to respond to reward magnitude over reward immediacy (i.e., waiting for a 
larger delayed reward) may have important implications for individuals who exhibit 
impulsive behavior.  Procedures that reverse choice responding from SSR to LLR are 
important to teaching an organism to tolerate delayed reinforcement.  Behavioral 
interventions to reduce impulsive choice responding have produced positive outcomes 
but are not well established in the current body of literature.  Procedures that have been 
investigated to reverse impulsive choice responding include progressive (fading) delay, 
concurrent activities, rules, commitment, reward linking and bundling, visual tools, pre-
trial response requirement, and conditioned reinforcement and exchange delays. 
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The purpose of this review was to determine how researchers have approached the 
development of treatments for teaching delay-to-reinforcement tolerance (i.e., self-
control choice responding) to nonhuman and human organisms.  More specifically, this 
review sought to identify teaching procedures that have been investigated to increase 
LLR choice responding, describe the methods and outcomes associated with those 
procedures, identify methodological concerns, and suggest directions for future research.  
Each procedure will be examined separately. 
Method 
To identify articles investigating procedures designed to alter impulsive choice 
responding (i.e., teach delay-to-reinforcement), four literature searches were conducted 
using the databases PsycINFO and Wiley Library Online.  The keywords were 
“Temporal discounting” and “Teaching self-control” for the first search, “Temporal 
discounting” and “Teaching delay-to-reinforcement” for the second search, “Delay 
Discounting” and “Teaching self-control” for the third search, and “Delay Discounting” 
and “Teaching delay-to-reinforcement” for the final search.  Resulting peer-reviewed 
articles were reviewed to meet the following inclusion and exclusion criteria.  The 
following inclusion criteria were used: the study must (a) focus on teaching an individual 
to tolerate delay-to-reinforcement in the context of concurrent schedules and (b) provide 
an operational definition of choice responding.  Excluded were articles that (a) focused 
solely on demonstrating the utility of quantitative models to fit participant data,  
(b) compared quantitative models, (c) identified choice responding patterns associated 
with specific diagnostic populations such as ADHD or maladaptive behaviors such as 
substance abuse, or (d) defined impulsivity as cognitive, biological, or cognitive 
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constructs.  Of the retained articles, a search of the references was conducted and studies 
that investigated procedures designed to alter choice responding were examined and the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied.  A total of 22 studies were identified using 
this search methodology. 
Results 
Participants.  Of the 22 studies that met the inclusion criteria, the effects of 
teaching procedures on choice responding were investigated with non-human participants 
in seven studies and human participants in 15 studies.  Non-human participants included 
pigeons in six studies (Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Jackson & Hackenberg, 1996; Mazur, 
2012; Mazur & Logue, 1978; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Siegel & Rachlin, 1995) and rats in 
two studies (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; Mazur, 2012).  Both pigeons and rats were 
subjects in the Mazur (2012) study.  Human participants included adults (ages 18 and 
over) in eight studies (Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata, 
2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Fisher, Bailey, & Willner, 2012; 
Hyten, Madden, & Field, 1994; Kirby & Guastello, 2001); children (ages 8 – 12 years) in 
one study (Vollmer et al., 1999); young children (ages 3 – 7 years) in five studies (Binder 
et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Gokey, Wilder, Welch, Collier, & Mathisen, 
2013; Newquist, Dozier, & Neidert, 2012; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988); and ages 
were not reported in one study utilizing a group design (Bailey, Willner, & Dymond, 
2011).  Of the 15 studies with human participants, one study included participants 
considered “typical” (Newquist et al., 2012), 11 studies included individuals with 
diagnoses such as autism, intellectual disability, or mental health impairments (Bailey et 
al., 2011; Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; 
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Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 
2003; Fisher et al., 2012; Gokey et al., 2013; Vollmer et al., 1999); one study included 
participants who were rated as impulsive by teachers (Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 
1988); and diagnostic information was not reported in two studies (Hyten et al., 1994; 
Kirby & Guastello, 2001).  Across the 22 studies identified for this review, there are a 
wide range of ages and populations investigated.  Although the external validity of 
procedures is increased, the empirical basis for the use of the following interventions with 
a specific age or population group is limited.  
Methods and outcomes.  The primary teaching goal across the 22 studies was to 
increase self-control choice responding meaning that a higher proportion of choices were 
allocated to the LLR.  Several studies additionally investigated treatment effects on 
increasing additional desired target behaviors (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata, 
2004) or decreasing problem behaviors (Dixon & Cummings, 2001). For example, one 
study measured increases in concurrent physical therapy exercises (e.g., open hand) in an 
adult with acquired brain injury (Dixon & Falcomata, 2004).  Dixon et al. (1998) 
identified desired target behaviors (e.g., in-seat) for each participant and measured the 
effects of a combined progressive delay/concurrent activity procedure on respective 
behaviors.  Dixon and Cummings (2001) measured effects on decreasing problem 
behavior (e.g., self-injury).  
Two out of the 22 studies included temporal discounting procedures associated 
with hypothetical rewards (Bailey et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 2012).  Rewards were 
delivered for each choice in the form of hypothetical monetary rewards added on a visual 
calculator, but real monetary rewards were not delivered.  One out of the 22 studies 
! 15!
delivered real rewards at the end of the session for one choice from a series of choices 
(Kirby & Guastello, 2001).  The other 19 studies included in this review delivered real 
rewards for each choice.   
Researchers investigated the effects of progressive delay in 11 studies, concurrent 
activities in 9 studies, rules in 2 studies, visual tools in 4 studies, commitment in 2 
studies, reward linking and bundling in 2 studies, and various combinations of these 
procedures in 10 studies.  Some studies investigated combined treatment effects; 
however, each procedure was included in all treatment categories that met the procedural 
definition. For example, if a study investigated a treatment package including progressive 
delay and concurrent activity procedures, then the study was included in both treatment 
categories.  Although the procedures can be grouped into these broader categories, the 
methods used across studies vary significantly. 
Progressive delay.  Eleven out of 22 studies included in this review examined 
progressive delay procedures (see Table 3).  Ten out of the 11 studies that examined 
progressive delay utilized the same general procedures of presenting both smaller and 
larger rewards immediately and then gradually increasing the delay or duration of task 
engagement to the larger reward.  One of the 11 studies examined an inverse of typical 
progressive delay procedures by presenting both smaller and larger rewards after a delay 
and gradually decreasing the delay to the SSR (Mazur & Logue, 1978).
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Two out of the 11 studies investigated progressive delay as an independent 
treatment (Mazur & Logue, 1978; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988), whereas 8 out of 
11 studies investigated progressive delay and concurrent activities as a treatment package 
(Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon et al., 
1998; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et al., 2013; Vollmer et al., 
1999).  When progressive delay was examined as an independent treatment, the delay 
was gradually altered and the experimenter did not provide access to activities or items 
during the delay.  When progressive delay procedures were investigated as a component 
of a treatment package, the delay to the larger reward was gradually increased but the 
experimenter presented a required task or access to a preferred activity/tangible during 
the delay.  When task engagement was required (e.g., physical therapy exercises), the 
duration of time that the participant was required to engage in the task as well as delay to 
the larger reward was gradually increased.  That is, there was both an increase in 
response effort as well as an increase in delay requirement.  
The specific procedures used across studies, however, varied widely in three 
significant ways including inconsistent initial delays, different methods of calculating 
delay goals, and varied methods of incrementally increasing the delay lengths. 
Inconsistent initial delays.  The initial delay is the delay at which the larger 
reward is presented at the onset of the progressive delay procedure.  Seven out of 11 
studies reported that the initial delay to the larger reward was 0 s (Benedick & Dixon, 
2009; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et 
al., 2013; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988; Vollmer et al., 1999).  For example, both 
the smaller and larger rewards were initially available immediately.  One study reported 
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alternate initial delay requirements.  Dixon and Cummings (2001) set the initial delay as 
the average of each participant’s natural baseline waiting duration.  In the natural baseline 
condition, the larger reward was placed in view of the participant who was told to wait as 
long as possible without eating/playing with the reward.  The amount of time that the 
participant waited was recorded across trials until it was relatively stable.  The mean 
length of waiting across trials conducted in this condition was then set as the initial delay 
for the larger reinforcer.  For example, if the mean of the participant’s natural baseline 
trials was calculated at 12 s, then the initial delay for the larger reinforcer was set at 12 s.  
Two of the 11 studies did not report the initial delay (Binder et al., 2000; Dixon et al., 
1998).  As mentioned previously, Mazur and Logue (1978) implemented an initial delay 
to both the smaller and larger rewards at 6 s. 
Different methods of calculating delay goals.  The delay goal is the maximum 
time requirement for access to the larger delayed item which is calculated to demonstrate 
a clinically significant increase in baseline waiting time or duration of task engagement 
(Dixon & Holcomb, 2000).  None of the studies reviewed provided a rationale for the 
calculation method used to determine the delay goal.  Six of 11 studies calculated the 
delay goal by multiplying the mean baseline waiting time or mean duration of baseline 
task engagement for each participant by an arbitrary number.  The authors did not 
provide a rationale for number choice.  Four studies calculated the delay goal by 
multiplying the mean baseline waiting time by 3 (Binder et al., 2000), 5 (Dixon et al., 
2003), or 12 (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Gokey et al., 2013); two studies calculated the 
delay goal by multiplying the mean duration of baseline task engagement (e.g., physical 
therapy exercise) by 7 (Dixon & Holcomb, 2000) or 10 (Dixon & Falcomata, 2004).  
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Benedick and Dixon (2009) calculated the delay goal for each participant based 
on patterns of choice responding during the choice baseline condition of the study.  Each 
session during choice baseline consisted of eight choice trials.  Choice responding was 
measured across a range of delays and three sessions of choice trials were conducted at 
each delay.  Based on choice baseline data, the delay goal for each participant was 
identified as the longest delay goal that was associated with either of two criterion that 
was satisfied.  Criteria one was used to identify the delay goal if choice baseline yielded a 
pattern of choice responding for the LLR that remained constant at four consecutive 
delays.  If criteria one was met, the longest delay associated with consistent choice 
responding for LLR was used as the goal.  Criteria two was used to identify the delay 
goal if choice baseline yielded a pattern of choice responding for SSR and the percentage 
of choices for LLR was below 10% on two of three consecutive delays.  If criteria two 
was met, the longest delay associated with consistent choice responding for SSR was 
used as the goal.  The delay goal was set as the longest delay identified by the two 
calculations.  Mazur and Logue (1978) reported a delay goal of 6 s and Dixon et al. 
(1998) reported a delay goal of 5 min but neither reported the method used to derive this 
goal.  Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff (1988) and Vollmer et al. (1999) did not report a 
delay goal and continued training until the sessions were ended due to variables such as 
time constraints or a pattern of choice responding for the SSR. 
Incrementally increasing delay lengths.  Progressive delay procedures begin with 
an equal or near equal initial delay to both the smaller and larger reward.  After the 
subject reaches a criterion for stability (i.e., LLR chosen on four out of five trials or two 
consecutive trials at each delay), which varied slightly across studies, the delay to the 
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larger reward is gradually increased in increments (e.g., 5 s).  Only four out of the 11 
studies set a constant incremental increase or decrease in duration of waiting at 0.25 s to 
0.5 s (Mazur & Logue, 1978), 2 s to 3 s (Binder et al., 2000), 5 s (Schweitzer & Sulzer-
Azaroff, 1988), or 10 s (Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004).  Four out 
of 12 progressive delay studies reported that the delay was “gradually increased” without 
specifying the quantitative value (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon et 
al., 2003; Vollmer et al., 1999).  
Two out of 11 studies reported incremental increases in task engagement.  One of 
the studies increased task engagement by a constant 60 s to 90 s increment (Dixon & 
Holcomb, 2000).  Another study calculated 12% of the delay goal for each participant 
and increased task engagement based on the calculation (Gokey et al., 2013).  For 
example, if the delay goal was calculated to be 120 s then the delay to the larger reward 
would gradually increase by 14.4 s.  It is important to note that Dixon and Hayes (1998) 
reported the use of an adjusting delay in which choice allocation for SSR during the first 
choice trial after an incremental increase in delay resulted in a decrease during the next 
session of trials.  Of the studies that examined progressive delay procedures, this was the 
only study that reported both delay increases and decreases contingent on choice 
response. 
In summary, outcomes across all studies investigating progressive delay are 
considered positive as they demonstrate patterns of increased delay-to-reinforcement 
tolerance and self-control choice responding.  The majority of studies reported increased 
choice responding for the LLR across all participants relative to baseline levels (Benedick 
& Dixon, 2009; Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon & Falcomata, 
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2004; Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et al., 
2013; Vollmer et al., 1999) or control subjects (Mazur & Logue, 1978).  One study 
reported a reverse in choice responding for LLR in five out of six participants 
(Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  Two out of 11 studies reported increased self-
control choice responding (Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Binder et al., 2000; Gokey et al., 
2013); whereas five different studies reported significant effects of progressive delay 
procedures on additional target behaviors such as group engagement, physical therapy 
exercises, and in-seat behavior (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon & 
Holcomb, 2000) as well as decreased problem behaviors such as self-injury (Dixon & 
Cummings, 2001; Vollmer et al., 1999).  
Progressive delay procedures are considered to be effective in increasing self-
control choice responding, increasing cooperative behaviors, and decreasing problem 
behaviors according to the current body of literature.  However, there are several 
limitations surrounding the investigation of this procedure.  First, progressive delay 
procedures are not widely used without additional treatment components such as 
concurrent activities.  Out of the 12 studies investigating progressive (fading) delay, two 
studies investigated effects independent of other treatments (Mazur & Logue, 1978; 
Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  As a result, the effectiveness of progressive delay 
as an independent procedure is not well established.  Second, the utility of progressive 
delay procedures specific to age or diagnostic groups is not clear.  Progressive delay 
procedures have been investigated across a wide range of age and diagnostic populations.  
Repeated replications of outcomes are not well established in any particular population.  
Third, and similar to the previous point, replication of methods across progressive delay 
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procedures is limited.  As discussed, variability in methods such as calculation of initial 
delay, delay goal, and delay increase/decrease limits the empirical basis of progressive 
delay treatment as standardized procedures have not been established. 
Several important implications may be drawn from these results.  Positive 
outcomes are reported across studies that investigated progressive delay procedures; 
however, many parameters related to the use of the procedures are unclear.  First, 
progressive delay procedures are considered to be one of the primary treatments effective 
for altering impulsive choice responding.  However, it has only been investigated 
independent of other procedures in two studies.  It is unclear whether progressive delay 
procedures are effective independent of other procedures or if a combination of 
procedures is necessary.  Second, progressive delay procedures that gradually increase 
task requirements may demonstrate a different effect compared to procedures that 
gradually increase delay alone.  Progressive procedures that gradually increase task 
requirements are, in actuality, gradually increasing both delay and response effort.  It is 
unclear whether the treatment effects are different when the reward is associated with 
delay and response effort versus delay alone.  Third, as discussed previously, the methods 
used across progressive delay procedures varied significantly across parameters such as 
initial delay, calculation of a delay goal, and increasing delay increments.  This is a 
problem because it is unclear which parameters are necessary for effective treatment.  For 
example, delay goals were calculated by multiplying natural baseline waiting durations 
by 12 with young children (Dixon & Cummings, 2001) and 3 with adults (Binder et al., 
2000).  It is possible that multiplying the delay goal by 12 contributes to successful 
treatment for young children.  Without justification of this method and further replication, 
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it is unclear whether parameters similar to this are necessary to the effectiveness of the 
procedure for specific ages or populations. 
! Concurrent activities.  Activities provided during delay requirements are 
considered highly effective in altering choice responding from SSR to LLR.  These are 
distractor activities that the participant engages in during the delay to the larger reward.  
Different types of concurrent activities have been investigated including both verbal and 
physical activities.  For the purposes of this review, verbal activity will only be 
considered to be a concurrent activity if it occurred for the entire delay.  For example, a 
statement that is repeated for the entirety of the delay will be considered a concurrent 
activity.  However, a statement that is made at the beginning of the delay but not repeated 
will not be considered a concurrent activity.  One study investigated verbal concurrent 
activities and included either a rule statement or random statement that was repeated 
throughout the delay to the LLR (Binder et al., 2000).  The rule statement repeated 
throughout the delay included “If I wait a little longer, I will get the bigger one.”  The 
random statement included “Black table, wobble, green.”  Physical concurrent activities 
required either engagement in a neutral task (e.g., sorting stimuli) or a targeted response 
requirement (e.g., physical therapy exercise).  
Providing a concurrent task during the delay has reliably been demonstrated to 
increase choice of LLR.  Significant effects have been demonstrated across different ages 
and populations.  However, this procedure has not been replicated within each age or 
population to an acceptable degree.  For example, differential responding was 
demonstrated with an adult with a brain injury in one study (Dixon & Falcomata, 2004); 
groups of adults with mental health impairments and intellectual disabilities in one study 
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(Dixon & Holcomb, 2000); adults with intellectual disabilities in one study (Dixon et al., 
2003); adults with developmental disabilities in one study (Dixon et al., 1998); typically 
developing young children in one study (Newquist et al., 2012); young children with 
autism in two studies (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Gokey et al., 2013); and pigeons in one 
study (Grosch & Neuringer, 1981).  The wide range of ages and populations investigated 
increases generality of these procedures, yet limits the empirical basis for the use of this 
intervention with a specific age or population group.  Out of the 22 studies reviewed, nine 
implemented some form of concurrent activity during the delay that varied by type of 
activity and required response effort (see Table 4).  
 







 Type of activity.  First, the type of activity that was implemented during the delay 
was significantly different across studies.  Three studies included a required task such as 
sorting manipulatives (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et al., 
2013); two studies offered optional activities during the delay such as availability of a 
preferred toy (Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Newquist et al., 2012); four studies included a 
required response such as physical therapy exercise (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & 
Falcomata, 2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon & Horner, 2003); and one study 
required verbal responses such as a participant rule statement repeated for the duration of 
the delay (Binder et al., 2000).  Second, out of the eight studies that included more than 
one participant, two studies reported different activities across participants (Dixon et al., 
1998; Gokey et al., 2013) and six studies required the same activity across participants 
(Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 
2003; Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Newquist et al., 2012).  For example, Dixon et al. 
(2003) implemented the same activity across participants in the form of placing foam 
cubes into a basket.  Gokey et al. (2013) conducted a preference assessment to identify a 
concurrent activity for each participant.  The activities identified included sorting blocks 
by shape, sorting bear figurines by color, and completing handwriting worksheets.  
Although this is the only study that reported identifying the concurrent activity via a 
preference assessment, it demonstrates the range of activities possible within a single 
study.   
Different activities across participants may be considered a significant limitation 
in the two studies included in this review that investigated different concurrent activities 
across participants using a multiple baseline across participants design (Dixon et al., 
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1998; Gokey et al., 2013).  Multiple baseline design relies on the logic that the 
independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable is demonstrated by a lack of 
change in the dependent variable in untreated conditions, while change is observed in the 
dependent variable as the independent variable is applied in a stepwise fashion.  The 
design requires the use of multiple baselines across behaviors of one participant, settings 
for one participant, or participants (multiple individuals); however, a change in two of 
these parameters simultaneously would not result in a demonstration of experimental 
control.  Dixon et al. (1998) and Gokey et al. (2013) examined the effects of a combined 
treatment (progressive delay and concurrent activities) on choice responding.  A 
significant limitation associated with these studies is that multiple baselines were applied 
across participants and target behaviors (of multiple individuals) simultaneously.  It is 
unclear whether changes in behavior are solely due to treatment and not the result of 
unknown variables related to different task requirements across participants.  The internal 
validity of the studies is compromised and results should be interpreted with caution.  
Response effort.  The different types of concurrent activities investigated varied 
based on the amount of response effort required to access the larger reward.  For 
example, presentation of a preferred toy (Newquist et al., 2012) or a preferred activity 
(i.e., sorting stimuli) (Gokey et al., 2013) requires much less response effort than 
participation in a difficult task (e.g., physical therapy exercise) (Dixon & Falcomata, 
2004).  Variability in response effort associated with concurrent activities may be an 
important dimension to consider in light of the lack of replication with any particular type 
of activity that has been investigated.  The effectiveness of an intervention to alter choice 
responding may be different when delayed rewards are subjectively weakened by delay 
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compared to delay and response effort.  That is, an individual may discount delayed 
rewards more heavily if the reward is both delayed and requires increased effort to obtain 
it.  As a result, the effects of an intervention may be less effective when the reward is 
discounted more heavily as a function of delay and response effort to obtain the reward 
compared to delay alone.   
In summary, outcomes across studies investigating concurrent activities are 
considered positive as they demonstrate patterns of increased delay-to-reinforcement 
tolerance, self-control choice responding, cooperative behaviors such as physical therapy 
exercises, and decreased problem behaviors such as disruptive behavior.  Five out of the 
nine studies reported increased self-control choice responding (Binder et al., 2000; Gokey 
et al., 2013; Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Newquist et al., 2012); while four different 
studies reported significant effects of concurrent activity procedures on additional target 
behaviors such as increased group engagement, physical therapy exercises, and in-seat 
behavior (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000) as 
well as decreased problem behaviors such as self-injury (Dixon & Cummings, 2001).  
Binder et al. (2000) specifically investigated whether the type of verbal activity had 
differential effects on choice responding.  The authors concluded that rule statements 
versus random statements as defined above did not differentially affect responding 
indicating that the type of verbal activity is not a significant factor.  
 Concurrent activity procedures are considered to be an effective intervention to 
increase self-control choice responding, increase cooperative behaviors such as physical 
therapy exercises, and decrease problem behavior such as self-injury.  However, there are 
limitations surrounding the investigation of this procedure.  First, concurrent activity 
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procedures are not widely used without additional treatment components such as 
progressive delay procedures.  Out of the nine studies investigating concurrent activities, 
only one of the studies investigated the effects of the procedure independent of other 
treatments (Newquist et al., 2012).  As a result, the effectiveness of concurrent activities 
as an independent procedure is not widely established.  It is important to note that there is 
a significant limitation related to the concurrent activity condition in the Newquist et al. 
(2012) study.  In the toy play condition, a choice for LLR resulted in access to a preferred 
toy.  In temporal discounting procedures, at least two choice options exist including a 
smaller reward immediately or a larger reward after a delay.  A concurrent activity is a 
distractor activity that is provided during the delay to the larger reward to increase delay-
to-reinforcement tolerance until the reward is delivered.  However, there was no reward 
delivered after the delay in the toy play condition.  The authors described the condition as 
a temporal discounting task involving a choice between SSR and LLR.  However, the toy 
play condition did not present a choice between SSR versus LLR with a toy available as a 
concurrent activity.  Instead there was a choice between two SSR or reinforcers available 
immediately.  The SSR was four edible items available immediately and the “LLR” was 
5 min access to a preferred toy also available immediately.  The contingencies associated 
with the “LLR” do not reflect a temporal discounting procedure as there is no weakening 
effect of the larger reward due to delay.  This limitation further adds to the paucity of 
literature supporting concurrent activities in the form of preferred tangibles.  
 Second, similar to progressive delay procedures, the utility of concurrent activities 
specific to age or diagnostic groups is not clear.  Concurrent activity procedures have 
been investigated across a range of age and diagnostic populations; however, replication 
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of outcomes is not well established in any particular population.  Third, replication of 
methods (i.e., the type of activity or response effort) across concurrent activity 
procedures is limited.  
Two implications may be drawn from the reviewed literature on concurrent 
activities.  Positive outcomes are reported across studies that investigated concurrent 
activities; however, many parameters related to the use of the procedures are unclear.  
First, concurrent activities are considered to be one of the primary treatments effective for 
altering impulsive choice responding.  However, it has only been investigated 
independent of other procedures in one study making it unclear whether concurrent 
activities are effective alone or if the combination of concurrent activities and progressive 
delay is necessary.  Second, the type of concurrent activity varies widely across studies.  
The effects of concurrent activities in the form of preferred tangibles (e.g., access to 
preferred toy) compared to a task requiring higher levels of response effort (e.g., physical 
therapy exercises) may result in different treatment effects.  This is a problem because it 
is unclear which types of tasks are effective in altering choice responding independent of 
progressive delay procedures.  
 Rules.  A rule is broadly defined as a statement that signals it is better to pick one 
choice option over the other.  Various forms of rules were investigated although methods 
differed in two significant ways.  Two out of 22 total studies included in this review 
investigated self-stated rules by the participant and an experimenter rule (Newquist et al., 
2012), as well as a combination of a self-stated rule and written rule (Benedick & Dixon, 
2009).  Participants included young children with no diagnosis (Newquist et al., 2012) 
and adults with a dual-diagnosis of mental illness and intellectual disability (Benedick & 
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Dixon, 2009).  Methods across the two studies differed by rule type, social mediation, 
placement of the rule, and outcomes. 
 First, the type of rule differed across studies.  A self-stated rule was investigated 
by Newquist et al. (2012) as well as Benedick and Dixon (2009).  Newquist et al. (2012) 
defined a “child rule” as a brief statement indicating the LLR choice as the better option.  
The participant was taught to say the rule after the choice was allocated to the LLR.  For 
example, when the LLR was chosen the child stated, “When I wait, I get four pieces” 
once after the delay.  Experimenter rule was also investigated and included a statement 
by the experimenter, “When you wait, you get four pieces” once after the delay when the 
LLR was chosen.  In the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study, a written rule combined with 
participant rule was investigated.  The Rule condition consisted of choice options 
between SSR and LLR each associated with a discriminative stimulus.  Prior to the 
presentation of each choice, a written rule was presented to the participant that stated, “It 
is better to pick the green card” indicating the LLR (associated with green discriminative 
stimulus) as the better choice option.  The participant was required to read the rule out 
loud.  It is unclear whether self-stated, experimenter, or written rules result in different 
choice responding patterns.  
Second, social mediation associated with the rule may be important to its 
effectiveness.  Because rules varied by type across the two studies, delivery of the rule by 
the experimenter (Newquist et al., 2012) versus a self-stated rule by the participant may 
yield different results.  For example, the attention associated with the experimenter 
delivered rule may affect responding differently than a self-stated rule by the participant 
that is not socially mediated.  The same is true with the addition of the written rule, the 
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combination of a written rule and a self-stated rule may affect choice responding 
differently than a self-stated rule alone.  
Third, the temporal placement of the rule may be important to patterns of choice 
responding.  In the Newquist et al. (2012) study, the rule was delivered after the choice 
was made.  Whereas the rule was delivered prior to the presentation of the choice option 
in the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study.  The placement of the rule may demonstrate 
different effects on choice responding as a rule delivered prior to the choice option 
functions as an antecedent manipulation while a rule delivered after the choice response 
functions as a consequence.  An antecedent rule may alter the likelihood of choice 
allocation to either SSR or LLR; however, a consequence rule may alter the probability 
that the individual will allocate choice to either SSR or LLR during future choice trials.  
That is, consequence rules may alter overall patterns of choice responding. 
The two studies investigating rules resulted in different outcomes.  Benedick and 
Dixon (2009) reported positive outcomes associated with delivery of a written rule 
combined with a self-stated participant rule.  This study also combined rule delivery with 
a progressive delay procedure.  Both the rule and no rule conditions consisted of a choice 
between a smaller immediate reinforcer and a larger reinforcer associated with a 
progressive increase in delay.  The authors reported that results demonstrated choice 
reversal to the LLR following training and the addition of rule delivery enhanced these 
effects.  However, treatment effects were not observed in the no rule condition which was 
associated with only a progressive delay procedure.  That is, a progressive delay 
procedure alone did not result in a significant change in choice responding for LLR.  The 
addition of rule delivery to the progressive delay procedure resulted in significant 
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increases in choice responding for the LLR.  It is possible that the rule primarily 
influenced choice responding or that a combination of procedures is necessary. The other 
study investigating rule delivery reported that providing brief rules was ineffective for 
increasing self-control choice responding (Newquist et al., 2012).  
In summary, there are several limitations and implications that may be drawn 
related to the effectiveness of rule delivery according to the literature included in this 
review.  Three limitations surrounding the investigation of this procedure are discussed.  
First, only two studies investigated the utility of rule delivery and one of the studies 
investigated the effects of a rule in combination with progressive delay.  As a result, 
support for the effects of rule delivery is limited. Second, the methods used across the 
two studies varied by type of rule, social mediation, and temporal placement of the rule.  
These differences in methods are significant considering a lack of research investigating 
rule delivery on choice responding and further limits the replication of procedures when 
using rules to alter choice responding.  Third, the two studies investigated rules across 
different ages (young children versus adults) and populations (typically developing 
versus mental health impairment plus intellectual disability).  Further replication is 
warranted considering the mixed outcomes associated with the limited investigation of 
this procedure.  
 Two implications based on this literature are discussed.  First, the effectiveness of 
rule delivery as a treatment procedure is unclear.  The addition of rule delivery to a 
progressive delay procedure resulted in a change of choice responding for LLR in the 
Benedick and Dixon (2009) study.  However, rule delivery did not have an effect on 
choice responding in the Newquist et al. (2012) study.  As a result, a clear conclusion 
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regarding the effectiveness of rule delivery cannot be drawn.  Second, it is unclear 
whether rule delivery alone or a combination of procedures including rule delivery may 
be effective in changing choice responding.  In the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study, a 
progressive delay procedure alone did not result in a significant change in choice 
responding for LLR.  However, the addition of rule delivery to the progressive delay 
procedure resulted in significant increases in choice responding for LLR.  It is unclear 
whether this change can be attributed to rule delivery alone or the combination of rule 
delivery (written and self-stated) plus progressive delay procedures.  Third, it is unclear 
whether one type of rule or a combination of rule types is necessary to alter choice 
responding.  In the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study, a written rule was presented in 
combination with a self-stated rule.  Results of the study indicated that this combination 
of rule delivery was effective at increasing LLR choice responding; however, it is unclear 
whether the rule types alone would be effective or this combination of rule delivery is 
necessary.  The Newquist et al. (2012) study investigated self-stated rules and 
experimenter rules as independent treatments.  Neither of the rule types altered choice 
responding.  The significant increase in choice responding observed in the Benedick and 
Dixon (2009) study warrants further investigation of the components and parameters 
necessary to the effectiveness of this treatment. 
Commitment.  Commitment involves allocation of choice to SSR or LLR before 
the choice option is presented.  The predetermined choice binds the subject to one option 
removing the alternate reward as an option.  That is, once a commitment is made to 
choose the LLR then the SSR is no longer an option.  Commitment procedures have 
primarily been investigated in nonhuman research.  Two out of 22 studies included in this 
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review investigated commitment procedures.  Rachlin and Green (1972) investigated the 
effects of a commitment response on impulsive choice responding.  Pigeons were 
presented with a choice option of SSR (2 s access to grain) available immediately versus 
LLR (4 s access to grain) after a delay (4 s).  However, subjects were presented with an 
opportunity to commit to a choice for either reward 6 s before the choice option was 
presented.  Choice allocation reversed to the LLR when a commitment to the LLR was an 
option.  The temporal distance from the commitment to the presentation of the choice 
trial was identified as a significant variable related to choice allocation.  Choice 
responding remained consistent for SSR when the duration between the commitment and 
choice option was short and reversed to consistent choice responding for LLR when the 
choice option was further delayed from the commitment.  
Siegel and Rachlin (1995) investigated a “soft commitment” procedure with 
pigeons involving the generation of patterns of choice responding using schedules of 
reinforcement.  A mathematical equation can be used to predict when choice allocation 
will reverse to the opposite pattern of choice responding during a calculated time period.  
Thus, choice allocation can be reversed to LLR at any point during the interval.  Within 
the study, self-control choice responding was exhibited if the subject did not switch from 
LLR choice responding to SSR choice responding.  The soft commitment procedure was 
designed to alter choice responding to the LLR by generating momentum of choice 
responding for LLR resulting in a resistance to reversing choice to SSR. 
 In summary, commitment strategies show promise for increasing self-control 
choice responding.  However, evidence of its effectiveness is heavily embedded in 
nonhuman research.  Although nonhuman research is often the foundation of effective 
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methodologies, interventions, and data analysis, generalization of results to humans and 
applied settings are limited (Lerman, 2003).  Additional research is needed to identify, 
refine, and develop effective practices for use in applied settings.  As a result, the use of 
commitment strategies to alter choice responding is promising with nonhuman subjects, 
but warrants further investigation to establish its utility in both nonhuman and human 
populations. 
Reward linking and bundling.  Two out of 22 studies included in this review 
investigated two procedures based on the principle that current choices are predictive of 
future choices (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; Kirby & Guastello, 2001).  Ainslie and 
Monterosso (2003) investigated the effects of a bundling rewards procedure with rats.  
Eight rats were exposed to two conditions with differing amounts of sucrose solution 
associated with SSR and LLR.  Choice presentation of a range of smaller amounts (25 to 
150 ml) of a sucrose solution was associated with immediate availability and a bundled 
amount of sucrose (3 reinforcer deliveries of 150 ml) was available after a delay.  On 
each choice trial, both choice options were available.  The results indicated that choice 
responding for LLR was greater when the chosen reward included multiple reward 
deliveries that are linked (bundled) compared to when rewards are chosen during single 
choice trials resulting in reward delivery after each choice.   
Kirby and Guastello (2001) investigated a procedure based on similar principles 
of predictive behavior.  The study investigated whether impulsive choice responding for 
SSR would reverse when rewards were presented in a linked series.  Choice trials 
consisted of a series of smaller rewards paired with a series of larger rewards.  For 
example, a choice trial may consist of the option between: $5 today, in 10 days, 20 days, 
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30 days, and 40 days or $10 in 16 days, 26 days, 36 days, and 46 days.  Choice options 
were presented within different formats including imposed linking (rewards directly 
bundled by experimenter), suggested linking (indirect suggestion of reward bundling by 
experimenter), and free linking (participant bundled rewards) but were all based on the 
same basic premise.  The authors reported that one-third of the participants reversed 
choice responding to LLR when rewards were presented within a series of choices that 
were directly bundled by the experimenter (imposed bundling) indicating that participants 
made current choices based on the prediction of future choices.  One limitation of the 
Kirby and Guastello (2001) study is the report of positive outcomes despite the large 
number of participants for which the procedure was not effective. If the reported 
probability of a treatment’s ineffectiveness is higher than it’s effectiveness, then there is 
likelihood that the procedure will not be effective in practice. If the procedure is 
implemented as a treatment and is ineffective in changing behavior, then further 
treatment options are necessary.  
In summary, reward linking and bundling procedures have implications worthy of 
further investigation.  First, both of the studies investigating either reward linking or 
bundling reported positive results for increasing self-control choice responding; however, 
these effects have only been demonstrated in basic studies limiting their use in applied 
setting or situations.  Thus, both of these procedures warrant further investigation.  
Second, it was reported in the Kirby and Guastello (2001) study that one-third of the 
participants altered choice responding when choices were presented within the series 
(reward linking).  The results have positive implications for reward linking procedures in 
some participants (approximately 24); however, there was a much larger proportion of 
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individuals for which reward linking did not alter choice responding (approximately 48).  
The significantly higher proportion of individuals for whom the procedure was 
ineffective compared to those for whom it was effective largely limits the external 
validity of the findings.  
Visual tools.  Four out of 22 studies included in this review investigated the use of 
visual aids that represented either calculated rewards (Bailey et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 
2012) or indicated the amount of time elapsed during a delay (Newquist et al., 2012; 
Vollmer et al., 1999).  Two of the four studies investigated the effects of a visual decision 
making tool on impulsive choice responding within group designs.  One study reported 
that participants were adults with intellectual disabilities (Fisher et al., 2012) while the 
other study reported that participants attended day services for individuals with learning 
disabilities but did not report the age range of participants (Bailey et al., 2011).  The 
visual aid investigated in the Bailey et al. (2011) study was referred to as a visual 
calculator that consisted of green bars (marked with 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 smiley faces) 
representing rewards and red bars (1, 2, 4, 7, or 14 smiley faces) representing waiting 
time.  The size of the bars represented their values.  The same visual calculator methods 
were followed across both studies (Fisher et al., 2012).  The authors reported that the 
visual calculator investigated in both studies resulted in more orderly data patterns and 
decreased impulsive choice responding in the Fisher et al. (2012) study.  The primary 
difference between the two studies was that the temporal discounting tasks used to 
measure impulsive choice responding was administered in a paper-and-pencil format in 
one study (Fisher et al., 2012); whereas, it was administered via a computer program in 
the other study (Bailey et al., 2011). It is unknown whether the visual calculator also 
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differed in format across the two studies (computer-based vs. manipulative based). If so, 
it is possible that individuals may not be as proficient when using the manipulative 
compared to a computer program. 
Two out of 4 studies investigated the effects of a visual countdown timer during 
the delay to LLR.  Vollmer et al. (1999) investigated the use of a countdown timer during 
the delay to LLR for a child with autism.  A digital timer was placed in the participant’s 
view and signaled the delay-to-reinforcement.  The timer was combined with a 
progressive delay procedure.  The authors reported that signaling delay-to-reinforcement 
by means of a countdown timer increased self-control choice responding.  In the 
Newquist et al. (2012) study, a time delivery condition was implemented independent of 
other interventions and defined as the experimenter starting the countdown timer and 
placing it in front of the participant.  The authors reported that providing a countdown 
timer during the delay to the larger reward did not increase delay-to-reinforcement 
tolerance.  The administration methods used in the two studies were very similar with the 
exception of the visual timer used in combination with another treatment in one study 
(Vollmer et al., 1999) and an independent treatment in the other (Newquist et al., 2012).  
 In summary, visual aids have reported positive outcomes overall. However, there 
were significant differences across the studies.  First, the form of visual aid was different 
between the studies.  A visual calculator and visual countdown timer serve two different 
functions.  The calculator is a visual representation of rewards earned and lost; whereas, 
the countdown timer is a visual representation signaling delay-to-reinforcement.  With 
two different purposes, the visual aids may also produce different effects on choice 
responding.  Second, the use of a visual countdown timer was reported as effective in one 
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study (Vollmer et al., 1999) and ineffective in the other (Newquist et al., 2012).  The 
most significant difference between the studies is that the timer was investigated 
independently in the Newquist et al. (2012) study whereas it was investigated in 
combination with a progressive delay procedure in the Vollmer et al. (1999) study.  
There are two implications that may be drawn from the limited body of literature 
investigating the utility of visual aids.  First, it is unclear how much influence the 
countdown timer had on choice responding independent of progressive delay procedures 
when positive outcomes were reported.  One study reported positive outcomes related to 
the use of a countdown timer, however, it was used in combination with a progressive 
delay procedure (Vollmer et al., 1999).  Considering that progressive delay procedures 
are considered to be one of the most effective treatments for increasing self-control 
choice responding, it is unclear whether the use of a countdown timer would be effective 
in isolation or whether the combination of the timer and progressive delay is necessary.  
Second, the two studies that investigated the utility of a visual calculator presented 
temporal discounting tasks that provided hypothetical rewards.  The participants 
experienced the monetary rewards in digital format but did not receive the SSR or LLR 
corresponding with the response for each choice trial.  It is possible that patterns of 
choice responding would be different if each choice resulted in delivery of real 
consequences.  This is particularly relevant if the participants do not have past 
experiences with the delays and reward amounts presented in the task. 
 Pre-trial response requirement.  One of the 22 studies included in this review 
investigated the effects of a pre-trial response requirement on impulsive choice 
responding with pigeons and rats (Mazur, 2012).  Subjects were required to engage in 
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differing amounts of responding (lever press or key peck) before choice presentation of 
SSR versus LLR.  For example, either one response or forty responses may be required 
before each choice trial.  Results indicated that rats consistently chose the LLR when 
more responding was required to reach the choice point; however, no consistent effects of 
the pre-trial ratio were found for pigeons.  
In summary, the data resulted in interesting implications.  It was suggested by the 
author that either rats may be more sensitive to long-term reinforcement rates than 
pigeons, or that rats do not discount delayed rewards as heavily as pigeons.  An alternate 
explanation is also possible.  A higher pre-trial response requirement results in a further 
delayed choice presentation.  As discussed previously with commitment procedures, the 
more time that is between the commitment point and choice point, the more likely an 
organism is to choose the LLR.  It is possible that pre-trial response requirements follow 
the same principles.  An FR 40 pre-trial response requirement increases the amount of 
time preceding the choice option compared to an FR 1 response requirement.  Similar 
effects on choice responding observed in studies related to commitment (Rachlin & 
Green, 1972) may be demonstrated by pre-trial response requirements.  The literature 
investigating pre-trial response requirements is limited to basic research and has not yet 
been applied to human choice studies. 
Additional considerations for altering choice responding.  Researchers have 
noted that choice responding demonstrated by nonhumans such as pigeons tend to be 
impulsive compared to a more shallow degree of choice responding often demonstrated 
by humans.  One explanation for this is that studies with nonhumans typically investigate 
choice responding using primary reinforcers such as access to grain (Mazur & Logue, 
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1978). Studies with humans that demonstrate self-control choice responding often use 
conditioned reinforces such as money (Scheres et al., 2006).  Two out of 22 studies 
included in this review investigated the effects of delay to token delivery and exchange 
periods on choice responding with pigeons (Jackson & Hackenberg, 1996) and adult 
humans (Hyten et al., 1994).  
Jackson and Hackenberg (1996) investigated self-control procedures that involved 
light illumination (LED) as a form of conditioned reinforcement.  Pigeon subjects could 
choose between one LED available immediately or three LEDs after a delay.  Each LED 
was exchangeable for 2 s access to grain during exchange periods.  When delays to 
exchange periods were based on choice allocation (exchange was available sooner if SSR 
was chosen compared to a further delayed exchange period associated with LLR), 
subjects generally chose SSR over LLR. However, when delays to exchange periods were 
held constant despite choice allocation, subjects generally chose LLR.  Results of the 
study demonstrated that subjects preferred the option that resulted in a greater amount of 
food more often if the choices also produced LEDs (conditioned reinforcers).  Results 
also indicated that delay to the exchange period had more influence on choice responding 
than delay to tokens. 
Hyten et al. (1994) investigated the effects of both delay to points (conditioned 
reinforcer) and exchange periods on choice responding in adult humans.  Two types of 
conditions were employed including point delay and exchange delay conditions.  Subjects 
were presented with choice options between SSR (smaller amount of points) available 
immediately versus LLR (larger amount of points) available after delays (15, 30, or 60 s).  
In the point delay condition, points were exchanged for money immediately following 
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sessions.  Subjects demonstrated self-control responding during this condition.  In the 
exchange delay condition, subjects were presented with choice options between SSR 
(smaller amount of points) available immediately and exchangeable immediately after the 
session versus LLR (larger amount of points) exchangeable for money after delays  
(1 day, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks).  In this condition, self-control choice responding was 
observed at a exchange delay of one day but reversed to impulsive choice responding 
when the delay to the exchange period was three or six weeks.  
 In summary, positive outcomes have been shown for the use of conditioned 
reinforcers to increase self-control choice responding, but more importantly that 
exchange delays have a more significant influence on choice responding for the LLR.  
This may be important to the development of interventions related to impulsive choice 
responding.  Conditioned reinforcers such as tokens are often used in the natural 
environment as rewards.  There is typically a delay associated with receiving tokens as 
well as to the exchange period.  If the subjective value of a larger amount of tokens is not  
weakened as a function of delay to receive the tokens, rather the subjective value of 
primary reinforcers associated with those tokens are weakened as a function of delay to 
the exchange period, then it is possible that more frequent exchange periods are necessary 
to treatment effectiveness.  
General Conclusions 
 Several themes emerged as a result of the current review.  First, there is an 
apparent need for further research.  As a whole, the current body of literature 
investigating procedures to teach delay-to-reinforcement tolerance is limited.  The wide 
range of ages and populations investigated increases generality of these procedures, yet 
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limits the empirical basis for the use of these treatments with a specific age or population 
group.  For example, although progressive delay procedures are supported by the 
literature, there is no empirical support for its use with adolescents.  It is also necessary to 
investigate novel procedures to address impulsive choice responding.  A variety of 
treatment options may be necessary to maximize effectiveness at the individual level.  
For example, it is possible that a concurrent activity may not be effective in altering 
choice responding and teaching delay-to-reinforcement in some individuals.  As a result, 
additional empirically based treatment options should be available.   
Second, a majority of the studies included in this review investigated combined 
treatment procedures.  The effectiveness of several procedures as independent treatments 
is unknown.  This is important when designing treatments that are both effective and 
efficient.  For example, if concurrent activities are effective independent of progressive 
delay procedures, increases in self-control choice responding may occur faster with 
implementation of concurrent activities alone compared to a treatment package.  Third, 
the methods associated with each procedure vary significantly resulting in unclear 
parameters necessary for treatment effectiveness.  This is important when implementing 
procedures to teach self-control choice responding as it is not clear which parameters are 
essential to the procedure’s effectiveness.  For example, several studies investigating 
progressive delay procedures gradually increase delay by varying time increments.  It is 
unclear how a researcher or practitioner should decide which parameters to follow.  For 
example, one study reports progressive delay methods involving incremental delay 
increases of 5 s while another study reports increases of 10 s.  Replication of current 
procedures is necessary. 
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Third, an important theme that emerged from analysis of the current body of 
literature is that although some treatment procedures currently available to address 
impulsive choice responding manipulate the length of the delay to the larger reward, none 
of the current procedures manipulate the amount of the reward.  As the change in reward 
value in temporal discounting is due to the length of the delay to that reward, 
manipulating time is a logical course of action.  However, there are a variety of 
dimensions that affect choice, and changes in either immediacy (length of delay) or 
magnitude (amount of reward) can have significant effects on behavior (Neef & Lutz, 
2001).  It may, therefore, be advantageous to investigate manipulating reward amount, 
rather than just reward delay, to determine whether manipulating amount could serve as 
an effective intervention to alter impulsive responding.   
As of yet, the effects of manipulating reward amount on impulsive choice 
responding has not been evaluated.  Progressive delay is the primary procedure that 
manipulates delay to the reward.  In progressive delay procedures, the magnitude of the 
SSR and LLR remains constant, but the delay to the LLR is systematically increased with 
each LLR choice.  In addition, delay to token delivery and exchange periods has been 
investigated.  The remaining procedures do not systematically alter delay, but rather 
focus on manipulating behaviors that occur either before the choice or during the delay. 
Concurrent activity procedures, for example, require engagement in certain activities 
during the delay.  Visual aids such as countdown timers provide a visual representation of 
the passage of time.  Rule delivery and commitment procedures focus on altering 
behavior prior to the presentation of the choice options. Rule delivery, for example, 
describes an optimal choice that should be made (i.e., they identify the LLR as the better 
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choice option). Commitment procedures require a binding choice allocation to either 
reward prior to the choice trial.  Last, although reward linking and bundling procedures 
do somewhat alter the amount of rewards, the amounts in these procedures remain static 
and do not change throughout the procedure.  Thus, no current procedures systematically 
alter amount of reward across trials to influence choice of the LLR. 
Manipulation of the amount of the larger reward while holding the delay constant 
may be an effective method of promoting self-control with temporally delayed choice 
options.  One method of manipulating the amount of reward might be to split the larger 
reward into both immediate and delayed portions.  Thus, the choice options would be 
between a small reward now (SSR) and a small reward now plus a larger reward later 
(SSR + LLR).  After selection of the SSR + LLR, small amounts of the immediate reward 
could be shifted to the delayed portion while the delay remained the same.  This could 
continue until the final choice options were between a SSR and a LLR.  If, for example, 
an option was presented between $300 now (SSR) versus $1,000 in one year (LLR), an 
impulsive choice for the SSR is likely.  If the amount of reward was manipulated, the 
choice might be between $300 now (SSR) versus $300 now plus $700 in one year (SSR + 
LLR).  Thus, the total amount of the reward remains the same ($1,000) but the amount is 
split across the delay.  Upon choice of the SSR + LLR, the reward can be shifted to $200 
now plus $800 after a delay, followed by $100 now plus $900 after a delay, and $1,000 
after a delay.  Shifting the amount of the larger reward may establish a pattern of choice 
responding for the larger reward after the delay, thereby promoting self-control as it 
pertains to temporal discounting. 
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One benefit of this approach is that this type of procedure could be implemented 
either as a stand-alone treatment or be combined with other procedures focusing on 
impulsive choice responding. For example, the effects of a progressive delay procedure 
may be enhanced by not only manipulating the delay (as is currently done) but also 
shifting portions of the LLR across the delay. Essentially, this treatment package may be 
even more effective at altering impulsive choice responding by addressing both of the 
primary dimensions related to discounting larger rewards (immediacy and magnitude of 
reward).  Manipulation of the amount of the larger reward to shift choice responding as 
described above provides another avenue for researchers to approach the study of 
temporal discounting.  
The current study sought to add to the current body of literature by investigating a 
novel procedure to teach self-control responding in young children.  If children can be 
taught to forgo smaller immediate rewards and make choices for larger delayed rewards, 
then it may be less likely that maladaptive behaviors will develop.  Thus, choices may be 
made for larger more favorable outcomes in daily life.  In the current study, a novel 
procedure that closely manipulated the amount of rewards associated with a delay was 
investigated with young children.  This novel method, called a shifting delay procedure, 
involved splitting the larger delayed reward into both an immediate and delayed reward, 
and then gradually shifted the immediate portion to the delayed portion.  The effects of a 











Participants and Setting 
 
 The study took place at a small preschool in a large metropolitan city in the mid-
south.  The school was a three-day weekly, play-oriented preschool program that 
provided educational services to typically developing children ages 4 months to 5 years 
old.  Children in the 4- and 5-year-old classes were invited to participate by a recruitment 
letter (see Appendix A).  The first six children to return the consent forms were recruited 
to participate in the study.  Two of the children in the study were identified by their 
teachers as impulsive, and each child’s parents/guardians consented to his or her 
participation (see Appendix B).  All of the children were Caucasian, and none of the 
participants were diagnosed with a disability specifically related to impulsivity at the time 
of the study.  Three males and three females participated.  Sally, Jake, and Melissa were 5 
years old; and Fred, Bobby, and Jessica were 4 years old at the time of the study.  
 All sessions were conducted in a classroom that was not being used for the current 
school year.  The classroom contained typical classroom materials such as shelving with 
blocks, tables, and chairs.  Sessions were conducted three times per week during morning 
hours and lasted approximately 15 min per assessment session and 5 min per choice 
session. 
Measurement  
 The dependent measure in this study was choice response.  This was defined as 
the participant indicating preference for either the smaller sooner reward or larger later 
reward by vocal or gesturing (i.e., pointing) to the preferred option.  Event recording data 
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was collected across choice trials.  Each choice option selected was recorded for each 
trial.  The primary independent variable in this study was a shifting delay procedure and 
was implemented across any of the participants for whom a stable pattern of baseline 
choice responding for SSR was obtained. Shifting delay procedures are described below 
and entailed manipulating the amount of the larger delayed reward by splitting it into 
both an immediate and delayed portion, and then systematically shifting the immediate 
portion to the delayed portion.  This procedure will be described in more detail below.  
Interobserver Agreement and Procedural Fidelity  
Two independent observers collected data for at least 50% of trials across 
participants through video recordings to assess interobserver agreement (IOA) and 
procedural fidelity.  The independent observers were doctoral level graduate students.  
Target behavior definitions and treatment procedures were explained by the 
experimenter. In addition, data sheets and checklists with steps associated with each 
condition were provided to each independent observer.  The independent observers were 
afforded the opportunity to ask any questions related to the procedures or data collection. 
For interobserver agreement, the independent observers recorded choice responding using 
identical measurement procedures.  Exact count-per-session IOA was calculated by 
comparing both measures and determining whether the measures for each trial agreed.  
The total number of agreements was then divided by the number of agreements plus 
disagreements and multiplied by 100.  Interobserver agreement was calculated across at 
least 50% of trials for all participants and measured at 100% across participants. 
 In addition to interobserver agreement, procedural fidelity was assessed.  A 
checklist was made listing the procedures for each condition including non-computerized 
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temporal discounting assessment; computerized temporal discounting assessment; 
baselines 1, 2, and 3; the shifting delay procedure; and the progressive delay procedure 
(explained below).  The specific steps of each condition were listed, and a second 
observer recorded whether or not the step was implemented across at least 50% of trials 
for all participants.  Levels of procedural fidelity were at 100% across participants. 
 Data for all tasks were recorded via paper and pencil by the experimenter with 
exception of the Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm (TCIP).  The computer program 
collected data for the TCIP assessment.  
Procedures and Experimental Design 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of a shifting delay procedure 
to teach self-control.  The effects of a shifting delay procedure were examined in a 
multiple baseline across participants design.  Participants were presented with 
concurrently available response options that resulted in either smaller immediate rewards 
or larger delayed rewards depending on the choice made.  Prior to investigating the 
effects of the shifting delay procedure on choice responding, a preference assessment and 
temporal discounting assessments were conducted in order to identify (a) preferred 
rewards, (b) individualized degrees of discounting, and (c) an appropriate delay goal for 
each participant. 
 Pre-assessment procedures.  The pre-assessment consisted of four possible tasks 
including (a) a Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) a non-
computerized version of the temporal discounting assessment similar to that conducted 
by Scheres et al. (2006), (c) a computer-based, manually controlled version of the 
temporal discounting assessment similar to that conducted by Scheres et al. (2006),  
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(d) the Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm purchased from the Neurobehavioral Research 
Laboratory and Clinic in San Antonio, TX, and/or (e) a natural baseline similar to that 
conducted by Dixon and Cummings (2001).  The purpose of the pre-assessment was to 
identify a preferred reward, the indifference point at which the smaller sooner reward 
(SSR) was equal in value to the larger later reward (LLR), and an individualized delay 
goal for each participant. 
 The pre-assessment portion of the study included a Multiple Stimulus Without 
Replacement preference assessment (MSWO) and three variations of temporal 
discounting assessments.  A MSWO preference assessment was conducted according to 
procedures outlined by DeLeon and Iwata (1996) to identify preferred rewards for each 
participant.  Different temporal discounting procedures were used across participants 
because of inconsistent data patterns. A degree of discounting was not indicated and an 
alternate form of temporal discounting assessment was used. 
 Preference assessment.  Five items were identified by the participants’ teachers 
as possible reinforcers including marshmallows, pretzels, Goldfish, Skittles, and M&Ms. 
The participant was seated in a chair at a table across from the experimenter.  The student 
was allowed to sample each item prior to the assessment.  The items were then sequenced 
randomly in a straight line on the table.  The experimenter instructed the participant, 
“Pick one.”  After the item was selected, the choice was recorded on the data sheet and 
was not replaced for the remainder of the assessment.  Before the next presentation the 
remaining items were rotated by taking the item on the left end and moving it to the right 
end, and then the other items were shifted to the left.  The procedure was repeated until 
all of the items were selected.  Each item was given a ratio based on the number of times 
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that it was selected over the number of times that it was available.  These procedures 
were repeated three times across three sessions.  The total number of times that each item 
was selected was divided by the number of times that each item was available to yield a 
score that indicated the percentage of trials during which the item was chosen.  Finally, 
the percentage score calculated for each item was used to rank the items from highest to 
lowest to identify the item that would potentially be the most effective reinforcer.   
Non-computerized temporal discounting assessment.  The initial temporal 
discounting assessment was a 120 trial presentation of hypothetical reward choices for 
both a preferred reward identified by the MSWO as well as pennies.  The assessment 
consisted of a constant larger later reward with manipulation of the smaller sooner reward 
in ascending and descending sequences as described by Critchfield and Kollins (2001).  
Critchfield & Kollins explain that the current value for the larger later reward is estimated 
by averaging the switch points (indifference points) in the ascending and descending 
choice sequences.  This assessment was modeled after the assessment described by 
Scheres et al. (2006).  
The assessment in the current study was a non-computerized, visual 
representation of the Scheres et al. (2006) assessment and presented choices of 
hypothetical rewards that the participants did not receive.  A poster board was separated 
into sections with a picture of a visual timer (TimerTouch© iPad application) 
representing the delay to the larger later reward.  The space between the smaller sooner 
reward and the larger later reward increased as the delay increased in order to provide a 
visual delay.  With the introduction of each new delay contingency, the experimenter 
said, “This is (X) seconds” and started the timer so the participant would experience each 
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delay length before making choices between an immediate or delayed reward.  The 
participants did not receive the rewards, as the assessment was entirely hypothetical.  
Each choice option was presented simultaneously with the smaller sooner reward on the 
left and the larger later reward on the right (see Figure 1). 
The participants were not told the duration of delays but instead experienced them 
(Scheres et al., 2006).  Participants sat across from the experimenter.  The experimenter 
provided directions that emphasized that there were no correct or incorrect answers by 
saying, “You are going to choose between a reward that you would be given right away 
or a bigger reward that you would have to wait to be given.  Let’s practice.  If the reward 
is on this line (point to line 1), then you would get the reward right away.  If the reward is 
on this line (point to larger later reward line), then you would get the reward in (X delay; 
e.g., 10) seconds (start visual timer to experience delay).  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  You pick the one that you would want if the reward was real.  You can point to 
the one that you choose.”  
  The experimenter then presented each choice trial by saying, “Would you rather 
have (X rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now or (Y rewards; e.g., marshmallows) after you 
wait?”  The participant vocally indicated and/or gestured to the choice preference, and the 
experimenter manually recorded choice responses.  At each new delay contingency, the 
experimenter said, “This is (X) seconds,” and began the timer for the participant to 
experience the delay before making choices.  In addition, the space between the 
immediate reward and the later reward was larger as the delay increased providing a 






Computerized temporal discounting assessment.  A computerized version of the 
temporal discounting assessment previously described was employed in order to conduct 
the assessment in a more efficient manner.  The participant was only required to point or 
vocally indicate preference of reward so computer skills were unnecessary.  The 
computerized version of the delay discounting assessment was identical to the non-
computerized version with the exception of it being conducted in digital format.  The 
computer-based assessment did not record data or advance automatically.  The 
experimenter manually conducted the assessment and recorded each response choice.  As 
with the non-computerized version, 120 choice trials representing hypothetical rewards 
were presented.  The same procedures were followed in this assessment as in the non-
computerized assessment. 
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 Two choice impulsivity paradigm.  The Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm 
(TCIP) is a computerized software program that requires participants to engage in a series 
of trials that indicate an individual’s level of impulsivity.  The TCIP has been 
investigated across adolescents (Dougherty et al., 2003) and adults (Moeller et al., 2002).  
The TCIP is a temporal discounting task in which participants choose between larger 
rewards associated with longer delays and smaller rewards associated with shorter delays.  
In this task, participants experienced the delay as well as rewards in the form of receiving 
points on a counter.  Participants engaged in discrete trials in which they selected a 
square or a circle.  The shapes appeared on the computer screen and the choice of the 
shape resulted in the respective consequence.  An adjusting delay procedure was used to 
find each participant’s indifference point at which he/she discounts delayed rewards and 
chooses smaller, more immediate rewards.  The indifference point was identified as the 
switch point when the objective value of the smaller sooner reward was equal in 
subjective value to the larger later reward.  
The TCIP program was run on a laptop with a track pad.  The participant sat next 
to the experimenter and was read the standardized directions for the TCIP program with 
three exceptions to accommodate for the age of the participants: (a) the six practice trials 
were conducted immediately after explanation of the practice trials and then the 
remainder of the directions were read to the participant instead of all of the directions 
being read first and the participant engaging in practice trials and choice trials 
consecutively; (b) the participants were explicitly told the contingencies that 3 points 
were associated with choosing the circle and 15 points were associated with choosing the 
square; and (c) the task was referred to as a “game” instead of “task.” 
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The assessment included six practice trials and 30 choice trials.  During the 
practice trials, the experimenter observed whether the participant was able to use the 
track pad on the laptop with ease.  The experimenter provided prompts as needed such as 
“We cannot talk during the game” or “Keep looking at the screen” throughout the 
assessment.  The participants were expected to select one of two shapes when they 
appeared on the computer screen.  A circle and a square appeared that were associated 
with respective contingencies.  The experimenter set parameters for the delay and reward 
contingencies.  The circle was associated with the smaller immediate (1 s delay) reward 
of 5 points, and the square was associated with the larger later reward of 15 points 
(adjusting delay).  A variable procedure was used in which the delay changed based on 
the participant’s responding.  The adjusting procedure allowed for the identification of an 
indifference point that indicates the point at which the two rewards are equally preferred.  
In the current study, if the participant chose the smaller sooner reward, the circle, then the 
larger later reward delay length was decreased by 5 s.  If the participant chose the larger 
later reward (i.e., the square) then the larger reward delay was increased by 5 s.  When 
the participant chose a shape, the corresponding reward was delivered after the delay 
requirement had been met.  The reward was delivered in the form of points that added to 
a cumulative points counter on the screen.  If the participant chose the circle, 5 points 
were delivered immediately.  If the participant chose the square, 15 points were delivered 
after the delay requirement was met.  
  Natural baseline.  The natural baseline was conducted using the most preferred 
reward identified by the MSWO.  The participant was seated at the table next to the 
experimenter.  The larger reward (e.g., 10 marshmallows) was placed on the table in view 
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of the participant.  The experimenter said, “You may eat this whenever you want, but 
wait as long as you can.  I’ll be over here.”  The experimenter then walked a few feet 
away with her back to the participant.  The trial was ended when the participant 
consumed the reward.  Latency from the time that the experimenter walked away to the 
time that the participant put the first reward in his/her mouth was recorded. 
 Experimental conditions.  Experimental conditions consisted of four possible 
conditions; (a) baseline 1 with a concurrent activity, (b) baseline 2 with a concurrent 
activity and a multiplied delay goal, (c) baseline 3 without a concurrent activity and with 
a multiplied delay goal, (d) shifting delay procedure, and (e) progressive delay procedure.  
During each condition both forced choice and free choice trials were conducted.  
 All experimental tasks were conducted using pictorial representation of the 
preferred reward, the delay (TimerTouch©), and the amount of the reward associated 
with each option (see Figure 2).  Participants vocally identified or pointed to their 
preferred choice.  With the introduction of each new condition, one forced trial was 
conducted to expose the participants to the delay and contingencies associated with each 
choice option.  Both forced choice and free choice trials began with the display of two 
choice options (see Figure 2).  The preferred reward was displayed above each choice 
option.  Each choice option had a picture visually representing the delay with the number 
of preferred rewards associated with each delay.  For example, the smaller sooner reward 
was represented graphically by a visual clock at 0:00 min with the number 3 underneath 
to represent “3 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now.”  The larger later reward was 
graphically represented by a clock with the calculated delay goal (e.g., 12 s) and the 
number of rewards that would be delivered after the delay underneath to represent “10 
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Forced choice trials.  A forced choice trial was conducted for each choice option 
one time prior to conducting free choice trials involving those contingencies.  During 
forced choice trials, the experimenter pointed to one of the choice options and told the 
child, “You are going to receive this reward.”  The participant experienced the 
contingency associated with the respective choice including a smaller reward delivered 
immediately or a larger reward delivered after a delay.  For example, the delay to the 
larger reward for baseline 1 was initially set as the indifference point alone, then the 
participants were exposed to baseline 2 with the new delay calculated as the indifference 
point multiplied by 12.  Before conducting free choice trials with the new contingency in 
baseline 2, a forced trial was conducted so participants would experience the 
contingencies associated with the new larger later reward choice.  Participants were not 
able to save the edible rewards.  Rewards were consumed before the participant went 
back to the classroom. 
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Free choice trials.  During free choice trials, the experimenter asked, “Do you 
want (X rewards) right now or (Y rewards) after you wait (X delay)?”  When the 
preferred choice was identified through vocal or gestural indication, the participant 
experienced the contingency associated with the respective choice.  Free choice trials 
were conducted only after a forced choice trial was conducted to introduce new 
contingencies. 
Baseline 1 with concurrent activity.  The indifference point for each participant 
was identified as the mean delay during the TCIP task and was used as the delay to the 
larger later reward.  The participant was seated at the table next to the experimenter with 
the smaller sooner and larger later reward choices presented as described above.  The 
experimenter asked, “Do you want 3 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now or 10 (rewards; 
e.g., marshmallows) after you wait (X delay)?”  Acceptable responses included pointing 
or vocally indicating choice.  Coloring was the concurrent activity presented across 
participants because it was identified as a neutral activity.  Participants often engaged in 
coloring in the classroom so it was not a novel activity yet was not identified as an 
aversive activity.  
The same activity was experienced by the participant regardless of whether he/she 
chose the SSR or LLR.  If the participant chose the SSR, the reward was delivered 
immediately and the participant was then allowed to color for a period of time equal to 
the delay length associated with the larger later reward contingency.  After the time 
elapsed, the activity materials were removed and the trial was ended. If the participant 
chose the LLR, then the experimenter said, “Since you picked that one, you will need to 
wait (X delay) before I can give it to you.  You may color while we wait.”  The 
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concurrent activity was provided, and the timer was started.  The reward was delivered 
after the delay elapsed, the activity materials were removed, and the trial was ended.  
Attention provided by the experimenter was minimal during the delay. 
Baseline 2 with concurrent activity and multiplied delay.  The condition differed 
from baseline 1 in that the indifference point was multiplied by 12 to identify a delay goal 
similar to procedures explained by Dixon & Cummings (2001).  All other procedures 
were identical to those described above.  The delay to the LLR was initially identified by 
the TCIP for participants 1, 2, and 3.  Baseline 1 data did not demonstrate that the larger 
later reward was discounted as a function of the identified delay (12 s) for two of the 
three participants.  Baseline 2 consisted of the initial delay multiplied by 12 to identify a 
delay at which the LLR might be discounted. 
Baseline 3 without concurrent activity, with multiplied delay goal.  Baseline 3 
was identical to baseline 2 with the exception of the removal of the concurrent activity.  
The participant was not provided with an activity to engage in during the delay.  The 
participant was seated at the table next to the experimenter with the smaller sooner and 
larger later reward choices presented as described above.  The experimenter asked, “Do 
you want 3 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now or 10 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) after 
you wait  (X delay).”  Acceptable responses included pointing or vocally indicating 
choice.  If the participant chose the SSR, the reinforcer was delivered immediately and 
the trial was ended.  If the participant chose the LLR, the experimenter said, “Since you 
picked that one, you will need to wait before I can give it to you.”  The timer was started, 
the reinforcer was delivered after the delay elapsed without a concurrent activity, and the 
trial was ended.  During the delay, participants were expected to remain seated at the 
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table without formally engaging in any activity.  It was noted that participants often 
counted, sang, or talked during the delay.  The experimenter did not intervene if the 
participant engaged in personal concurrent activities such as those mentioned.  However, 
if the participant attempted to leave the seat or engage with the experimenter, then 
prompts were provided including “Please stay in your seat” and “ Please wait.” 
Shifting delay procedure.  The shifting delay procedure began with an option of a 
smaller reward immediately (SSR) or a smaller reward immediately plus a larger reward 
(SSR + LLR) after a delay.  When the participant chose the smaller reward immediately 
plus the larger reward after a delay for two consecutive trials, then the reward was shifted 
to decrease the amount given immediately and increase the amount delivered after the 
delay.  Ultimately, the participant would be offered a smaller reward immediately or a 
larger reward after a delay with a history of choosing the larger reward with a delay.  For 
example, the participant might be offered 3 rewards immediately or 3 rewards 
immediately plus 7 more after the delay (see Figure 3).  Once two consecutive choices 
were made for the LLR, then the immediate reward was faded to the delayed reward and 
the participant was offered 3 rewards immediately or 2 rewards immediately plus 8 more 
after the delay.  The shifting reinforcement for the LLR continued to 1 immediately plus 
9 later, then to 10 later.  The last phase of the teaching procedure was identical to 
baseline as the participant was offered 3 rewards immediately or 10 after the delay.  
Vocal or gestural indication of the preferred choice resulted in the presentation of the 





Progressive delay procedure.  For Jake, a progressive delay procedure was 
implemented to shift choice allocation from the SSR to the LLR as the shifting delay 
procedure proved ineffective.  This progressive delay procedure was not conducted with 
other participants either due to time constraints or because the shifting delay procedure 
proved effective and no further procedures were necessary.  The progressive delay 
schedule of reinforcement followed procedures presented by Dixon et al. (1998), Dixon 
and Holcomb (2000), and Dixon and Cummings (2001).  Progressive delay procedures 
typically involve presentation of both the large and small rewards immediately with 
delivery of the larger reward being gradually delayed over time (Schweitzer & Sulzer-
Azaroff, 1988).  For example, progressive delay procedures begin delay values for both 
choice options at 0 s and the delay associated with the larger reward increases by 
increments (e.g., 5 s each time a predetermined criterion is reached) (Binder et al., 2000; 
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Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  In the current study, progressive delay procedures 
were adapted due to time constraints and implemented with Jake.  Instead of beginning 
the procedure with both rewards available immediately, the experimenter identified the 
delay at which Jake chose the LLR for two consecutive choice trials beginning at a delay 
of 15 s.  The delay to the LLR was increased by 5 s increments after two consecutive 
choices for the LLR were made at each delay.  Vocal or gestural indication of the 
preferred choice resulted in the presentation of the preferred reward immediately or after 
fulfilling the delay requirement. 
Pennies.  Throughout baseline and experimental conditions, pennies were 
presented in choice trials probed across conditions.  Penny trials were identical to 
baseline 1, 2, and 3 trials.  However, the amount of pennies did not change across 
treatment conditions and remained constant at 3 immediately versus 10 later.  The 
purpose of conducting trials with pennies was to investigate the possible generality 
effects of experimental conditions to a novel reward. Pennies were provided contingent 
upon choice for either reward. However, pennies were not exchangeable for primary 
rewards within the study. 
Condition Variability Across Participants  
There were a variety of variables that influenced which conditions each 
participant was exposed to, and these variables will be discussed later for each participant 
(see Table 5).  As a result of the computerized and non-computerized temporal 
discounting assessments not producing a consistent data pattern for Jake, Sally, or 
Melissa, the experimenter planned to conduct the TCIP with all participants to identify 
the degree of discounting and a delay goal.  However, after the TCIP program was 
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conducted with Jake, Sally, and Melissa, the program reported an error and shut down 
during multiple attempts to complete the temporal discounting task with Fred.  As a 
result, a natural baseline condition similar to Dixon and Cummings (2001) was 
implemented to identify the average latency wait time and a delay goal for Fred, Jessica, 
and Bobby.  Based on the pre-assessment data, choice preference was assessed across 
baseline and treatment conditions for each participant.  Baselines were staggered across 




 Jake.  Jake was exposed to the initial pre-assessment tasks including the non-
computerized and computer-based versions of the temporal discounting task modeled 
after Scheres et al. (2006) and the TCIP task as an attempt to identify an indifference 
point for choosing delayed rewards.  Based on the TCIP task, Jake’s indifference point 
was identified as 12 s by the mean delay during the adjusting delay procedure.  He then 
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participated in experimental conditions including baseline 1, baseline 2, baseline 3 and 
shifting delay.  He also participated in a progressive delay procedure similar to 
Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff (1988), Dixon and Cummings (2001), Binder et al. 
(2000), and Dixon et al. (2003). 
Sally.  Sally was exposed to the initial pre-assessment tasks identical to Jake, as 
well as baseline 1 and 2 conditions.  Sally’s indifference point was also identified as 12 s 
based on the mean delay of the TCIP task.  However, Sally was discontinued as a 
participant after she reported that her parent told her to pick the LLR, and the data 
supported an abrupt switch in choice preference.  
Melissa.  Melissa was exposed to the initial pre-assessment tasks identical to 
Jake, as well as baseline 1, 2, and 3 conditions.  Melissa’s indifference point was 
identified as 12 s based on the mean delay of the TCIP task.  A baseline of consistent 
SSR choice was not obtained for Melissa, as she was not discounting the delayed reward.  
As a result, Melissa was never exposed to the shifting delay condition. 
Fred.  Fred participated in natural baseline and baseline 3.  According to natural 
baseline results for Fred, the mean waiting time was calculated to be 10.75 s.  His delay 
goal was calculated by multiplying his mean waiting time from natural baseline by 12 
according to procedures presented by Dixon and Cummings (2001).  The delay goal was 
calculated to be 129 s.  After obtaining a steady state of choice responding for SSR in 
baseline 3, Fred was exposed to the shifting delay procedure.  
Jessica.  Jessica participated in conditions identical to Fred.  Her mean waiting 
time in natural baseline was 3.25 s.  Her delay goal was calculated in the same manner as 
described above to be 39 s. 
! 66!
Bobby.  Bobby participated in conditions identical to Fred and Jessica, and the 
same procedure was used to calculate his delay goal of 141 s based on his mean waiting 
















































 Pre-assessment.  Jake was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including  
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) non-computerized 
temporal discounting assessment, (c) computerized temporal discounting assessment, and 
(d) Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm.   
 Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment.  Jake’s preferred 
reward was miniature marshmallows.  The percentage score for marshmallows was 0.5 
indicating that it was chosen on 50% of the trials in which it was available.  This was 
predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of those presented.  This assessment was not 
repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.  
Temporal discounting assessments.  For Jake, neither the non-computerized nor 
the computerized temporal discounting assessments yielded a clear demonstration of 
discounting delayed rewards.  The TCIP task identified Jake’s indifference point as 12 s 
based on the mean delay of the adjusting delay choice procedure.  
 Experimental conditions.  Jake was exposed to experimental conditions  
(a) baseline 1, (b) baseline 2, (c) baseline 3, (d) shifting delay procedure, and  
(e) progressive delay procedure. 
 Baseline.  Figure 4 demonstrates Jake’s choice responding in baselines 1, 2, and 
3.  Jake chose SSR for 75% of trials and LLR for 25% of four total baseline 1 trials.  
There was a stable choice responding pattern for SSR.  In baseline 2, Jake chose SSR for 
50% of trials and LLR for 50% of trials. In baseline 3, Jake chose SSR for 83.33% of 
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trials and LLR for 16.67% of trials.  In this final baseline there was a relatively stable 
choice for SSR.!
Shifting delay procedure.  When the shifting delay procedure was implemented, 
the initial choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in stable choice responding 
for SSR.  Jake chose SSR for 75% of trials and LLR for 25% of four total choice trials.  
As a result of consistent SSR choices, the contingencies were altered (3 now vs. 5 now + 
5 later) so that the reward available immediately in the LLR choice option was more than 
the SSR option.  However, the new choice option did not result in a shift of choice 
response to LLR.  Jake continued to choose SSR for 100% of two choice trials.  The 
experimenter returned to the initial contingency of the shifting delay procedure (3 now 
vs. 3 now + 7 later) and Jake chose SSR for this one trial. In an attempt to isolate a 
potentially competitive variable of activities in the classroom, the experimenter offered 
Jake the initial shifting delay contingency choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) with 
the added contingency of Jake returning to the classroom during the delay and the 
experimenter delivering the reward at the classroom door when the delay elapsed.  Jake 
continued to make a choice for SSR at 100% for two choice trials.  At this point, the 
experimenter offered a choice trial of “3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows now” 
in order to assess present motivation for the reward.  One choice trial with both reward 
amounts available immediately was conducted.  Jake chose 10 marshmallows now, which 
was interpreted as a present motivation for the larger reward.  
Progressive delay procedure.  The shifting delay procedure did not result in a 
shift of choice response to LLR for Jake.  As a result, the experimenter implemented an 
empirically based procedure, progressive delay, that has been demonstrated to be 
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successful in increasing LLR choice responding (Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & 
Cummings, 2001; Dixon et al., 2003; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). The delay was 
significantly reduced to 15 s as a starting point.  At a delay of 15 s, Jake chose SSR 
across two trials.  As a result, the delay was reduced to 5 s.  At a 5 s delay, Jake chose 
LLR for two consecutive trials.  From this point forward, the delay was increased by 5 s 
when LLR was chosen for two trials consecutively.  After two consecutive choices were 
made for LLR at a 5 s delay, the delay was increased to 10 s.  Four trials were conducted 
with this delay value.  Jake chose LLR for the first trial but switched to SSR on the 
second trial.  As a result, more trials were conducted for which Jake chose LLR for two 
consecutive trials.  The delay was increased to 15 s and Jake continued to choose LLR for 
two consecutive trials.  The delay was increased to 20 s and Jake chose SSR for two 
consecutive trials.  The experimenter would have conducted further trials to examine 
overall trend at this delay value; however, time was limited as the school year ended. 
Pennies.  Probe trials were conducted to assess possible generalized effects in 
choice responding across rewards.  There was no clear difference in responding across 
conditions for Jake.  He made a choice for LLR during 57% of seven trials across 
baselines 1 and 2, 50% of two trials in baseline 3, and 28.57% of seven trials across 
shifting and progressive delay procedures. 
Bobby 
Pre-assessment.  Bobby was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including  
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment and (b) natural 
baseline.  
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 Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment.  Bobby’s 
preferred reward was marshmallows.  The percentage score for marshmallows was 0.75 
indicating that it was chosen on 75% of the trials in which it was available.  This was 
predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of those presented.  This assessment was not 
repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.  
 Natural baseline.  Bobby was exposed to four natural baseline trials.  Latency 
was measured at 11, 16, 10, and 10 s respectively.  The mean waiting time to the larger 
reward was 14.5 s for Bobby.  His baseline delay was calculated to be 141 s. 
  Experimental conditions.  Bobby was exposed to experimental conditions  
(a) baseline 3 and (b) shifting delay procedure. 
 Baseline.  Figure 4 demonstrates Bobby’s choice responses in baseline 3.  Bobby 
chose SSR for 100% of trials during five total baseline 3 trials.  There was a stable choice 
responding pattern for SSR.  
Shifting delay procedure.  When the shifting delay procedure was implemented, 
the initial larger delayed choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in consistent 
choice responding for LLR.  With two consecutive choices for LLR at each shifted 
contingency (3 now vs. 2 now + 8 later; 3 now vs. 1 now + 9 later), Bobby continued to 
make a consistent choice for LLR.  However, an abrupt change in choice responding 
pattern occurred when exposed to the final shifting delay choice option (3 now vs. 10 
later).  When presented with 3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows later, Bobby 
chose SSR for 100% of three total trials.  A reversal to the previous shifting delay 
contingency (3 now vs. 1 now + 9 later) was employed; however, Bobby continued to 
make a choice response for SSR.  Bobby reported that he needed to choose the smaller 
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reward because his mother did not like him to have a lot of marshmallows in a day.  It is 
unclear if this had an effect on Bobby’s choice response or if motivation for the larger 
reward was low.  One trial was presented with both rewards available immediately, and 
Bobby made a choice for SSR.   
 Pennies.  There was no clear difference in responding across conditions for 
Bobby.  He made a choice for LLR during 25% of eight probe trials across baseline 3 and 
shifting delay conditions.  He demonstrated a consistent pattern for SSR. 
Jessica 
Pre-assessment.  Jessica was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including  
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment and (b) natural 
baseline.  
 Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment.  Jessica’s 
preferred reward was Goldfish.  The percentage score for Goldfish was 0.43 indicating 
that it was chosen on 43% of the trials in which it was available.  This was predicted to be 
the most effective reinforcer of those presented.  This assessment was not repeated once 
further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.  
 Natural baseline.  Jessica was exposed to four natural baseline trials. Latency was 
measured at 4, 2, 3, and 4 s respectively.  The mean waiting time to the larger reward was 
3.25 s for Jessica.  Her baseline delay was calculated to be 39 s. 
  Experimental conditions.  Jessica was exposed to experimental conditions        
(a) baseline 3 and (b) shifting delay procedure. 
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 Baseline.  Figure 4 demonstrates Jessica’s choice responses in baseline 3.  Jessica 
chose SSR for 75% of trials and LLR for 25% of eight total baseline 3 trials.  There was a 
relatively stable choice responding pattern for SSR.  
Shifting delay procedure.  When the shifting delay procedure was implemented, 
the initial larger delayed choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in consistent 
choice responding for SSR.  Jessica chose the smaller immediate reward for 75% of four 
total shifting delay trials with the initial choice contingencies.  Jessica made a comment 
to the experimenter that she no longer wanted the reward.  At this point, the experimenter 
offered two choice trials of “3 Goldfish now vs. 10 Goldfish now” in order to assess 
present motivation for the reward.  Jessica chose 3 Goldfish now, which was interpreted 
as low motivation for the larger reward. 
 Pennies.  There was no clear difference in responding across conditions for 
Jessica.  She allocated a higher proportion of choices for LLR during baseline 3 
compared the shifting delay condition. 
Fred 
 Pre-assessment.  Fred was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including  
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment and (b) natural 
baseline.  
 Multiple stimulus without replacement.  Fred’s preferred reward was pretzels.  
The percentage score for pretzels was 0.75 indicating that it was chosen on 75% of the 
trials in which it was available.  This was predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of 
those presented.  This assessment was not repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and 
experimental conditions began.  
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 Natural baseline.  Fred was exposed to four natural baseline trials. Latency was 
measured at 19, 7, 8, and 9 s respectively.  The mean waiting time to the larger reward 
was 10.75 s for Fred.  His baseline delay was calculated to be 129 s. 
  Experimental conditions.  Fred was exposed to experimental conditions  
(a) baseline 3 and (b) shifting delay procedure. 
 Baseline.  Figure 4 demonstrates Fred’s choice responses in baseline 3.  Fred 
chose SSR for 80% of trials and LLR for 20% of 10 total baseline 3 trials.  There was a 
relatively stable choice responding pattern for the SSR.  
 Shifting delay procedure.  When the shifting delay procedure was implemented, 
the initial larger delayed choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in consistent 
choice for LLR.  With two consecutive choices for LLR at each shifted contingency  
(3 now vs. 2 now + 8 later; 3 now vs. 1 now + 9 later), Fred continued to make a 
consistent choice for LLR.  A similar pattern continued through the final shifting delay 
choice option (3 now vs. 10 later).  When presented with 3 pretzels now vs. 10 pretzels 
later, Fred chose SSR for 43% and LLR for 57% of seven total trials.  Across all shifting 
delay choice trials, Fred chose LLR for 77% of total shifting delay trials.  
 Pennies.  There was no clear difference in responding across conditions for Fred.  
He made a choice for LLR during 30% of 10 probe trials across baseline 3 and shifting 




Figure 4. Choice responses for marshmallows and pennies for Jake, marshmallows and pennies for Bobby,  
Goldfish and pennies for Jessica, and pretzels and pennies for Fred. The effects of a shifting delay procedure  




Pre-assessment.  Sally was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including  
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) non-computerized 
temporal discounting assessment, (c) computerized temporal discounting assessment, and 
(d) Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm.  
Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment.  Sally’s preferred 
reward was identified as pretzels.  The percentage score for pretzels was 0.6 indicating 
that it was chosen on 60% of the trials in which it was available.  This was predicted to be 
the most effective reinforcer of those presented.  This assessment was not repeated once 
further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began. 
Temporal discounting assessments.   For Sally, neither the non-computerized nor 
the computerized temporal discounting assessment yielded a clear demonstration of 
discounting delayed rewards.  The TCIP task identified Sally’s indifference point as 12 s 
based on the mean delay of the adjusting delay choice procedure. 
Experimental conditions.  Sally was exposed to experimental conditions  
(a) baseline 1, (b) baseline 2, and (c) baseline 3. 
 Baseline.  Figure 5 demonstrates Sally’s choice responses in baselines 1, 2, and 3. 
Sally chose SSR for 50% of trials and LLR for 50% of four total baseline 1 trials.  There 
was a variable choice responding pattern in this condition.  Sally chose LLR for 100% of 
four total baseline 2 trials and two total baseline 3 trials.  At the conclusion of the second 
baseline 3 trial, Sally reported that her mother instructed her to choose the larger reward.  
In consideration of the increased delay requirement and withdrawal of concurrent activity 
in baselines 2 and 3, the abrupt change in responding supports the potential influence that 
the external variable had on choice.  No further trials were conducted with Sally.  
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 Pennies.  Across baseline conditions, Sally demonstrated a clear choice 
responding pattern for SSR.  She chose SSR for 100% of three total baseline 1 trials and 
66% of three total baseline 2 trials.  Sally was never exposed to treatment conditions for 
pretzels so trials with pennies were discontinued as well. 
 




Pre-assessment.  Melissa was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including  
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) non-computerized 
temporal discounting assessment, (c) computerized temporal discounting assessment, and 
(d) Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm.   
Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment.  Melissa’s 
preferred reward was miniature marshmallows.  The percentage score for marshmallows 
was 0.6 indicating that it was chosen on 60% of the trials in which it was available.  This 
was predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of those presented.  This assessment was 
not repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.  
 Temporal discounting assessments.  For Melissa, neither the non-computerized 
nor the computerized temporal discounting assessment yielded a clear demonstration of 
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discounting delayed rewards.  The TCIP task identified Melissa’s indifference point as  
12 s based on the mean delay of the adjusting delay choice procedure.  
 Experimental conditions.  Melissa was exposed to experimental conditions  
(a) baseline 1, (b) baseline 2, and (c) baseline 3. 
 Baseline.  Figure 6 demonstrates Melissa’s choice responses in baselines 1, 2, and 
3.  Melissa chose SSR for 25% of trials and LLR for 75% of four total baseline 1 trials.  
There was a stable choice responding pattern for LLR.  Melissa chose SSR for 25% of 
trials and LLR for 75% of four total baseline 2 trials.  There was a consistent choice 
responding pattern for LLR.  Melissa continued to choose LLR for 100% of four total 
baseline 3 trials.  There was a stable choice responding pattern for the LLR across 
baseline conditions.  Melissa was not exposed to treatment conditions, as she was not 
discounting delayed rewards. 
Pennies.  Probe trials were conducted to assess possible generalization effects in 
choice responding across rewards.  There was no clear difference in responding across 
conditions for Melissa.  She made a choice for LLR during 67% of nine probe trials 
across baselines 1, 2, and 3.  Melissa did not discount the larger delayed reward.  Melissa 
was not exposed to treatment conditions for marshmallows; as a result probe trials with 
pennies were discontinued as well.  
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The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of a shifting delay procedure 
on choice responding between SSR versus LLR in young children.  Expansion of the 
range of treatments available to teach children to choose larger delayed rewards is 
necessary and evident in the current body of literature.  Although there are a variety of 
treatments that have been investigated to alter impulsive choice responding, few of these 
procedures are firmly embedded in the literature. Further, all of the procedures that are 
currently available focus on either manipulating the delay associated with the larger 
reward, providing rules or requiring pre-commitments to a specific choice, provide visual 
representations of the passage of time, bundle rewards, or manipulate the behaviors that 
occur during the delay.  None of the currently available procedures manipulate the reward 
amounts, which leaves the effects of this approach largely unexplored. However, the 
value of either reward in a temporal discounting choice arrangement is the result of both 
delay to that reward and the amount of reward available. Systematically manipulating the 
amount of a larger reward may prove effective as a standalone treatment, or could 
possibly be combined with other treatment that manipulates delay length.  In this study, a 
novel treatment procedure was investigated to teach tolerance of delay-to-reinforcement 
to young children by manipulating the amount of the larger delayed reward.  This 
procedure was termed a shifting delay procedure. Differential effects were observed 
across participants.  Although the effects of this procedure have not clearly been 
established, this may be a treatment option that warrants further inquiry.  In addition, 
regardless of the specific procedures, it may prove advantageous for researchers to 
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continue to investigate procedures that manipulate amount of reward to determine 
whether this is an effective approach to promoting self-control. 
Implications 
 The findings of the current study provide several implications significant to delay 
discounting measures and teaching delay-to-reinforcement tolerance to young children.  
The findings indicate that (a) the utility of using hypothetical rewards and delays for 
temporal discounting procedures in young children may be questionable, (b) a shifting 
delay procedure may be an effective and possibly more efficient treatment than what is 
currently available for teaching self-control responding to young children, and (c) the 
initial effects of progressive delay procedures demonstrated by previous literature are 
further supported by this study. 
Hypothetical versus real discounting tasks.  This study raises questions as to 
the utility of hypothetical discounting tasks for young children. In the current study, three 
participants were exposed to both computerized and non-computerized temporal 
discounting assessments.  Both assessments were based on hypothetical rewards and 
delays.  Results did not show consistent choice responding across any of the three 
participants exposed to them.  Each delay was associated with 24 choice trials with 
ascending and descending amounts of SSR pitted against a constant LLR.  The 
indifference point for each delay option is typically identified as the point at which the 
choice for the LLR reverses to the SSR during the ascending choice sequences and vice 
versa for the descending sequences.  However, choice responding across the three 
participants exposed to those conditions did not show this clear response pattern.  Instead 
of switching from the LLR to the SSR and remaining steady, their responses fluctuated 
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between the two options and no indifference points could be determined.  Similar data 
patterns yielded from hypothetical temporal discounting assessments have been discussed 
previously in the literature.  Critchfield and Atteberry (2003) reported that discounting 
studies with adults!exclude!up!to!15% of their data due to inconsistent patterns such as 
multiple reversals in choice allocation.  It is possible that the exclusion of inconsistent 
data patterns is much higher in discounting studies with children.  Reed and Martens 
(2011) reported that they excluded nearly half (43.4%) of the data from a study with 
young participants whose data did not demonstrate a clear discounting effect.  A possible 
explanation for this is that young children typically do not have an extensive learning 
history with a range of delays and reward magnitude.  
A child may have limited prior experiences with making choices between SSR 
and LLR and experiencing contingencies associated with those choices.  This presents a 
problem with hypothetical choice tasks because young children are expected to make a 
series of choices across a range of hypothetical delays and rewards.  This lack of history 
with real contingencies may significantly impact choice allocation in hypothetical choice 
tasks.  In conventional behavioral methodology, it is commonly understood that behavior 
is determined by past consequences.  If a child has not experienced real consequences 
associated with similar delays and reward magnitude to those presented in a hypothetical 
task, then actual choices may be different than those that are verbally reported.  For 
example, Reed and Martens (2011) discuss this concern in the previously mentioned 
study conducted with a sample of sixth-grade students.  A temporal discounting task 
consisting only of hypothetical choice trials was presented and nearly half of the students 
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did not demonstrate a discounting effect.  The authors explain that the students may have 
had limited learning histories with similar choices.   
If the degree of discounting in hypothetical choice tasks does not correlate to an 
actual degree of discounting, then the use of hypothetical methods to identify impulsive 
behavior in children is questionable.  Additionally, if there is a lack of learning history 
with rewards and delays presented in a task, then temporal discounting procedures based 
on contact with real rewards and delays may help build a within-study learning history.  
Choice responding may be different if a child experiences rewards and delays compared 
to that of the hypothetical tasks even if the experience is only within the parameters of the 
study.  The effects of discounting delayed rewards demonstrated by the procedures with 
real rewards and delays might more closely correspond to the behavior that they verbally 
describe (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001).  As a result, it is possible that temporal 
discounting tasks based on real delays and rewards are more likely to demonstrate 
consistent data patterns in young children. 
Effects of a shifting delay procedure.  A shifting delay procedure may be an 
effective and possibly more efficient treatment than what is currently available for 
teaching self-control responding to young children.  Differential effects on choice 
responding were observed in two of the four participants for whom treatment conditions 
were employed.  After the shifting delay procedure was implemented, both Fred and 
Bobby allocated a higher proportion of choices to the LLR compared to baseline.  
Although allocation of choices reversed to the SSR in the final phase of the shifting delay 
procedure for Bobby, a significantly higher proportion of choices were allocated to LLR 
overall when treatment procedures were implemented.  Further, a shifting delay 
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procedure is potentially a more efficient method of teaching delay-to-reinforcement 
compared to a progressive delay procedure.  For example, Fred’s calculated delay goal 
was 129 s.  If a progressive delay procedure was implemented with 5 s incremental delay 
increases, he could ideally reach his goal in 50 to 52 trials.  If a shifting delay procedure 
was implemented, Fred could ideally reach his goal in 8 to 10 trials.  The effects of a 
shifting delay procedure observed in this study warrant future investigation.  
Effects of a progressive delay procedure.  The initial effects of the progressive 
delay procedure observed with Jake support the current literature.  The shifting delay 
procedure did not differentially affect choice responding for Jake; however, the 
progressive delay procedure demonstrated differential effects on choice responding 
although at delay lengths far below those used in the shifting delay procedure.  It is 
unclear whether choice responding would have remained consistent at the delay without 
further choice trials, however, initial effects demonstrated by the progressive delay 
procedure on choice responding in young children supports those observed in previous 
studies (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  
Generality of treatment effects.  Pennies were presented in choice trials probed 
across baseline and experimental conditions.  Penny trials were identical to baseline 1, 2, 
and 3 trials except the number of pennies did not change across treatment conditions and 
remained constant at 3 immediate vs. 10 later.  The purpose of conducting penny trials 
was to investigate the possible generalization effects of experimental conditions to a 
novel reward.  Treatment effects were observed in the shifting delay condition for two 
participants (Fred and Bobby) and in the progressive delay condition (Jake).  When 
penny trials were conducted alongside treatment trials, there were no clear differences in 
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choice compared to baseline penny trials.  In fact, there were a higher percentage of LLR 
choices made in baseline conditions compared to treatment conditions for Jake, Fred, and 
Bobby.  
Treatment effects observed with Jake, Bobby, and Fred did not generalize to a 
novel reward (pennies).  There are four conclusions that may be considered.  First, the 
shifting delay and progressive delay procedures resulted in a change of choice responding 
to LLR for edible rewards but not pennies.  It is possible that the untrained stimulus 
(pennies) was not similar enough to the trained stimulus (edibles) to promote stimulus 
generalization.  That is, pennies did not evoke the same response (choice for LLR) as the 
edibles.  Second, pennies are conditioned reinforcers and edibles are primary reinforcers.  
It is possible that young children discount delayed conditioned reinforcers differently 
than primary reinforcers.  Young children may not have a learning history associated with 
the value of pennies.  If children do not have experiences related to contingencies 
associated pennies, then pennies may not have the same subjective value as an edible.  
For example, if a young child does not have experiences related to exchanging pennies 
for rewards then the subjective value of a larger amount of pennies associated with a 
delay may be less than the subjective value of a small number of pennies available 
immediately.  Third, pennies were not assessed as a preferred reward in this study.  
Preference assessments were conducted across participants to identify a preferred reward 
to be used in choice trials to identify treatment effects produced by teaching procedures.  
However, pennies were chosen to assess generality effects because monetary rewards are 
used often in temporal discounting tasks as a result of their association with access to 
primary reinforcers (Scheres et al., 2006).  Within the parameters of the current study, 
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pennies were not exchangeable for rewards. Fourth, it is possible that satiation influenced 
choice responding during penny trials.  All three participants allocated a higher 
proportion of choices to LLR during penny baseline trials compared to penny treatment 
trials.  Pennies are not consumable in contrast to the edible rewards used for teaching 
trials.  If participants were saving the pennies instead of exchanging them for other 
rewards outside of the study, then it is possible that pennies lost their value due to 
satiation. 
It is important to note that no strategies were implemented to promote 
generalization from the trained rewards to the pennies in the current study.  Essentially, a 
train and hope strategy (Stokes & Baer, 1977) was adopted as one purpose of this study 
was to investigate generalization without explicit programming.  It is possible that 
generalization of treatment effects to the pennies may have been more likely if strategies 
that promote generalization such as multiple exemplars or teaching loosely had been 
utilized. For example, using a variety of rewards to teach delay-to-reinforcement 
tolerance may increase the likelihood that treatment effects will be generalized to a novel 
reward. In addition, training loosely by varying noncritical stimuli during teaching 
sessions may increase the likelihood that the same choice response will be made across 
settings and situations as those made during teaching sessions.  
Limitations 
 There were several limitations of this study including (a) time constraints,  
(b) parental influence, (c) adapted temporal discounting assessments, (d) low motivation 
for rewards, and (e) self-imposed concurrent activities.  
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 Time constraints.  In this study, time was a limiting factor as a result of the 
school year ending.  With at least two of the participants it would have been beneficial to 
conduct further trials in order to draw more stable conclusions from the final conditions 
implemented.  For example, a progressive delay procedure was employed to investigate 
differential effects on choice responding for Jake.  An initial effect on choice responding 
was observed as choice allocation was reversed to the LLR and remained consistent 
across delays of 5 s, 10 s, and 15 s.  At a delay of 20 s, Jake reversed choice allocation 
back to the SSR.  The school year ended and no further trials were possible.  However, 
further trials would be necessary to determine a pattern of choice responding at this and 
additional increased delays.  For Bobby, when the larger reward choice was shifted to 10 
later during the shifting delay procedure, an abrupt reversal in choice allocation to the 
SSR was observed.  The reversal in choice responding may indicate that the shifting 
delay procedure did not maintain initial effects observed within the first three phases.  
One choice trial presenting both smaller and larger options available immediately  
(3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows now) resulted in a choice for the smaller 
reward.  This was interpreted as low motivation for the LLR, however, further trials 
would be necessary to verify consistently low motivation for the reward and investigate 
other potential variables influencing choice responding.  
 Parental influence.  Two of the children verbally reported to the experimenter 
that they were instructed by a parent to respond in a specific manner during choice trials, 
and it is unclear how this variable affected choice allocation for those participants.  For 
Sally, an abrupt change in choice responding was observed during baseline 1 and 
continued across baselines 2 and 3 which were associated with an increased delay (mean 
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delay identified by the TCIP task multiplied by 12) and the removal of the concurrent 
activity.  She later reported that her mother instructed her to choose the LLR.  Although 
there was a marked increase in delay in baselines 2 and 3 and no distracting activity 
available in baseline 3, choice responding remained constant for LLR.  The abrupt 
change in responding and resistance to discounting the LLR across baseline procedures 
supports the potential influence that parental intervention had on choice allocation.  For 
Bobby, an abrupt change in choice responding from the LLR to SSR was observed during 
the final phase of the shifting delay procedure.  Choice responding remained constant for 
the SSR across a reversal to the previous shifting delay phase in which choice was 
previously allocated to LLR.  He reported that his mother instructed him to choose the 
SSR, and the abrupt change in responding supports the potential influence that parental 
intervention had on choice allocation.  It should also be noted that the experimenter did 
not ask participants if they were instructed by a parent or teacher to respond in a 
particular way during choice trials.  It is unclear if parent or teacher intervention 
influenced responding across any of the participants.  
 Adapted temporal discounting assessments.  The experimenter designed the 
non-computerized and computerized temporal discounting assessments used in this study.  
Both assessments presented 120 hypothetical choice trials that consisted of a constant 
LLR with manipulation of the SSR in ascending and descending sequences as described 
by Critchfield and Kollins (2001).  Smaller delays and reward magnitude as well as 
implementation of a visual delay are all examples of procedures adopted from Scheres et 
al. (2006).  The adapted assessments used in this study yielded inconsistent data patterns 
across the three participants for whom the procedures were implemented.  Although the 
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designs of the assessments were based on procedures supported by the literature, the 
validity of the newly developed assessments is not empirically supported.  
 Low motivation for rewards.  It is possible that there was a loss of motivation 
for rewards for two of the participants over the course of this study.  Limited trials were 
conducted daily with only two to three trials per day (never exceeding 20 individual 
rewards; e.g., Goldfish); however, it is possible that satiation occurred over time.  For 
Jessica, two choice trials presenting both smaller and larger options available 
immediately (3 Goldfish now vs. 10 Goldfish now) resulted in choices for the smaller 
reward.  For Bobby, one choice trial presenting both smaller and larger options available 
immediately (3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows now) resulted in choice for the 
smaller reward as well.  The choice for the SSR in this choice trial was interpreted by the 
experimenter as low motivation for the LLR.  In this choice option, the subjective value 
of the larger reward is not discounted as a result of a delay.  The two options differ only 
in objective value.  A choice for the SSR may indicate that the value of the larger reward 
is decreased because motivation for the reward is low.  Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff 
(1988) reported similar observations of possible satiation, as two participants would 
occasionally return their rewards to the experimenter. 
 Self-imposed concurrent activities.  It was observed in this study that several 
participants engaged in self-imposed verbal activity during the delay.  Participants were 
observed counting, talking, and telling stories.  For example, in the current study Fred 
was observed counting to 20 during the delay across several trials.  Researchers have 
proposed that concurrent activities self-employed by young children may be explained as 
a predetermined choice for the LLR (Rachlin & Green, 1972).  For example, if Fred 
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committed to choosing the LLR before the choice trial was presented, then a self-imposed 
concurrent activity such as counting could serve as a distractor for tolerating the delay. In 
the current study, it is unclear how self-imposed concurrent activities may have 
influenced choice responding.. 
Future Research 
 There are a variety of future directions suggested by this research study including 
(a) expansion of the empirical basis for current teaching procedures, (b) the effects of an 
abolishing operation on choice responding, and (c) replication of the shifting delay 
procedure. 
Expansion of the literature.  Future research should further investigate the 
development of procedures for increasing delay-to-reinforcement tolerance and 
expanding the empirical foundation of methods currently available.  Behavior analysts 
have operationally defined “impulsivity” and “self-control,” and are refining procedures 
to objectively assess this behavior, but there is a general lack of research-based treatment 
options for teaching delay-to-reinforcement tolerance.  Behavior is affected by the 
environment on an individual level and needs to be addressed accordingly. There are 
currently a limited number of research-based procedures for addressing impulsive choice 
responding in young children.  
It is also necessary to further investigate procedures currently available to teach 
delay-to-reinforcement tolerance.  Concurrent activities and progressive delay procedures 
are the most widely investigated procedures used to increase choice responding for LLR.  
However, the literature is limited in two ways.  First, these procedures have been largely 
investigated as treatment packages such as a progressive delay procedure plus concurrent 
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activity (Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003).  Few studies 
have investigated the procedures separately (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Schweitzer & 
Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  It is also necessary to identify variables critical to each 
procedure’s effectiveness in order to develop standardized procedures essential to its 
application. Second, there are limited studies that have investigated these procedures with 
young children (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).  Young 
children are more likely to yield impulsive choice responding patterns (Scheres et al., 
2006). It is possible that teaching a child to choose larger delayed rewards may lead to 
choices for more favorable rewards in daily life. If consistent choices for LLR are made, 
maladaptive behaviors may be less likely to develop. Further research is warranted to 
develop standardized procedures to teach delay-to-reinforcement.  
Effects of an abolishing operation on choice responding.  Future research 
might investigate the effects of an abolishing operation on choice responding.  An 
abolishing operation is a stimulus that has two effects on behavior (a) a value altering 
effect and (b) a behavior altering effect (Laraway, Snycerski, Michael, & Poling, 2003).  
When a stimulus is presented that serves as an abolishing operation, the value of a reward 
diminishes and behaviors that have accessed that reward in the past decrease as well.  For 
example, drinking a large glass of water will decrease its value and engaging in behaviors 
that have resulted in water in the past will decrease as well.  When presenting individuals 
with choice options between SSR and LLR, it is possible that delivering a small amount 
of the reward prior to choice trials (pre-trial rewards) may serve as an abolishing 
operation for the reward and individuals may be able to better tolerate the delay to the 
LLR.  The effects of the abolishing operation may make it more likely that individuals 
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will better tolerate delay to the LLR.  For example, assuming that marshmallows were 
identified as a preferred reward, then providing a small amount of marshmallows prior to 
a choice trial may serve as an abolishing operation for the SSR and make it more likely 
that a delay to the larger reward would be tolerated.  For example, if 3 marshmallows are 
delivered before a choice trial of 3 marshmallows now or 10 marshmallows later, it may 
be possible that the value of the SSR and behaviors that access the SSR are decreased.  
The diminished value of the SSR and decreased likelihood of making a choice for the 
SSR may make it more likely that an individual would choose the LLR.  The small 
amount of pre-trial reward could be systematically faded out until no more pre-trial 
rewards are delivered once choice responding for LLR is consistent. This procedure 
differs from the one investigated in the current study in two ways. First, the small amount 
of reward would be delivered prior to the choice trial and would not be associated with 
either choice option. Second, the small amount of reward would fade out completely until 
it is no longer delivered prior to choice presentation.  
 Replication of the shifting delay procedure.  Positive effects of a shifting delay 
procedure were observed with two out of the four participants exposed to this condition. 
For the other two participants, treatment was ineffective in shifting choice allocation. The 
current study is the first to closely manipulate the amount of rewards to alter impulsive 
choice responding. Although the effects observed in this study were not robust, those 
observed with Bobby and Fred may warrant further investigation to establish if shifting 
the amount of a delayed reward is a viable treatment option. It may be more beneficial to 
replicate shifting delay methods investigated in this study to establish treatment efficacy 
before investigating variations of the procedure. 
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General Conclusions 
Procedures that reverse choice responding from smaller immediate rewards to 
larger delayed rewards are important to teaching an organism to tolerate delayed 
reinforcement. If young children are taught to tolerate delay, then choices will result in 
more favorable outcomes and maladaptive behaviors are less likely to develop. 
Behavioral treatments designed to reduce impulsive choice responding have produced 
positive outcomes but are not well established in the current body of literature. Thus, 
there is a need for standardized treatment procedures and treatment options available to 
teach children to choose delayed rewards. 
The current study yielded differential effects across participants and provide 
several important implications.  First, the utility of hypothetical temporal discounting 
tasks with young children is questionable.  It is possible that temporal discounting tasks 
based on real delays and rewards are more likely to demonstrate consistent data patterns 
in young children.  Second, a shifting delay procedure may be an effective and possibly 
more efficient treatment than what is currently available for teaching tolerance of delay-
to-reinforcement in some young children.  Third, the initial effects of progressive delay 
procedures demonstrated by previous literature are further supported by this study.  
Although the current study has several limitations, the implications are important to the 
expansion of literature investigating temporal discounting procedures used with young 
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List of Terms 
Objective Value – the actual worth of a reward 
Subjective Value – the perceived worth of a reward 
Temporal Discounting – a decrease in subjective value of a reward as function of delay to 
the reward’s presentation 
Larger Later Reward (LLR) – a larger number of reinforcers available after a delay 
relative to a small number of reinforcers available more immediately 
Smaller Sooner Reward (SSR) – a small number of reinforcers available more 
immediately relative to a larger number of reinforcers available after a delay 
Indifference Point – identified when both the larger later reward and smaller sooner 
reward are equally preferred or equal in subjective value 
Choice Response – identified preference for a reward option through vocal or gestural 
indication           
Choice Responding – multiple preferences for rewards identified through a series of 
choice trials  
Impulsivity – a stable pattern of choices allocated to smaller sooner rewards 
Self-control – a stable pattern of choices allocated to larger later rewards 
Delay-to-Reinforcement Tolerance – choosing larger rewards associated with a delay 








Volunteers Wanted for a Research Study 
!
!
Delay Discounting: Using a Shifting Delay Procedure to Teach 
Self-Control 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate a procedure that may 
be effective in teaching a child to make less impulsive choices, 
thus demonstrating self-control. The study will measure the 
choices that a student makes when presented with the choice 
between a smaller sooner reward and a larger later reward. The 
study will take approximately 1 to 2 months to complete.!
!
Every student from the class is invited to participate. !
Students who participate will receive small incentives for 
participating in the study such as stickers, erasers, or pencils. !
The study will be conducted at Hope Preschool. To learn more 
about this research, contact Tiffany Freeze Denton at 615-
584-2990. !
This research is conducted under the direction of James 
Meindl, Ph.D., BCBA-D in the Instruction and Curriculum 











Parental Permission for Your Child to Participate in a Research Study 
Delay Discounting: Using a Shifting Delay Procedure to Teach Delay-to-Reward 
WHY IS YOUR CHILD BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? 
Your child is being invited to take part in a research study about using a teaching procedure to 
teach the skills of choosing a larger later reward instead of a smaller sooner reward, a 
characteristic of self-control.  Your child is being invited to take part in this research study 
because any child in the classroom is invited to participate.  If your child takes part in this study, 
your child will be one of about 9 children to do so.   
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? 
The person in charge of this study is Tiffany Freeze Denton, Ed.S., NCSP, BCBA of The 
University of Memphis Department of Instruction and Curriculum Leadership. She is being guided 
in this research by James Meindl, Ph.D, BCBA-D.  There may be other people on the research 
team assisting at different times during the study. 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? 
The purpose of this study is to investigate a procedure that may be effective in teaching a child to 
make less impulsive choices, thus demonstrating self-control.  
 
By doing this study, we hope to learn if this new teaching procedure is successful in teaching self-
control when children are asked to make choices. 
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOUR CHILD SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? 
There are no known factors that will exclude your child from participating in this study. 
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?  
The research procedures will be conducted at Hope Preschool.  Your child will need to come to a 
designated room at Hope Preschool approximately 15 to 20 times during the study.  Each of 
those visits will take about 5 to 15 minutes.  The total amount of time your child will be asked to 
volunteer for this study is 1.5 hours over the next 2 months.  
WHAT WILL YOUR CHILD BE ASKED TO DO? 
Visit 1:  The first visit will include a brief assessment that will identify preferred rewards for your 
child. Basically, your child will be allowed to choose the most preferred reward from several. 
Visit 2:  The second visit will include an assessment that will identify the degree of impulsivity that 
your child exhibits. Your child will make several choices between a reward that he/she would be 
given immediately or a larger reward that he/she would get later. In this phase of the study, your 
child will not be given the rewards chosen. 
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Visits 3-19:  The rest of the visits except for the last visit will include your child making one choice 
between a smaller reward that he/she will be given immediately or a larger reward that they will 
be given after a short delay. In this phase of the study, your child will be given the reward that 
he/she chooses.  
Final Visit:  The last visit of the study will be the same as the second visit. It will include an 
assessment that will identify the degree of impulsivity that your child exhibits. Your child will make 
several choices between a reward that he/she would be given immediately or a larger reward that 
he/she would get later. In this phase of the study, your child will not be given the rewards chosen.  
At the end of each visit, your child will receive a small incentive for participation such as a sticker. 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? 
To the best of our knowledge, the things your child will be doing have no more risk of harm than 
your child would experience in everyday life. 
WILL YOUR CHILD BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
There is no guarantee that your child will get any benefit from taking part in this study.  However, 
some people have experienced the ability to make less impulsive choices, relating to self-control 
when similar teaching procedures have been used.  Your child’s willingness to take part, 
however, may, in the future, help society as a whole better understand this research topic. 
DOES YOUR CHILD HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
If you decide to allow your child take part in the study, it should be because your child really 
wants to volunteer.  Your child will not lose any benefits or rights your child would normally have if 
your child chooses not to volunteer.  Your child can stop at any time during the study and still 
keep the benefits and rights your child had before volunteering.  !
IF YOUR CHILD DOES NOT WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER 
CHOICES? 
If your child does not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in 
the study. 
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU FOR YOUR CHILD TO PARTICIPATE? 
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study. 
WILL YOUR CHILD RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
Your child will receive small incentives for taking part in this study such as stickers, erasers, or 
pencils. 
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOUR CHILD PROVIDES? 
We will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify your child to the extent 
allowed by law.!
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Your child’s information will be combined with information from other children taking part in the 
study. When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the 
combined information we have gathered. Your child will not be personally identified in these 
written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, we will keep your child’s 
name and other identifying information private.   
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that 
your child gave us information, or what that information is. Your child’s name will be converted to 
code so each participant's identity is unknown. In addition, all data will be kept either on a 
password-protected computers or in locked file drawers. 
The student's decision to participate will be held confidential. To maintain this confidentiality, 
parental consent will be mailed directly to the researcher. In doing so, only those individuals 
participating in the study will be aware of their participation. 
We will keep private all research records that identify your child to the extent allowed by 
law.  However, there are some circumstances in which we may have to show your child’s 
information to other people. For example, we may be required to show information which 
identifies your child to people who need to be sure we have done the research correctly; these 
would be people from such organizations as The University of Memphis. 
 
CAN YOUR CHILD’S TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? 
If your child decides to take part in the study your child still have the right to decide at any time 
that your child no longer want to continue.  Your child will not be treated differently if your child 
decide to stop taking part in the study.   
The individuals conducting the study may need to withdraw your child from the study.  This may 
occur if your child are not able to follow the directions they give your child or if they find that your 
child’s being in the study is more risk than benefit to your child. 
 
 
WHAT IF YOUR CHILD HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR 
COMPLAINTS? 
 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation for your child to take part in the study, please 
ask any questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have questions, suggestions, 
concerns, or complaints about the study, you can contact the investigator, Tiffany Freeze at 615-
584-2990.  If you have any questions about your child’s rights as a volunteer in this research, 
contact the Institutional Review Board staff at the University of Memphis at 901-678-3074.  We 
will give you a signed copy of this permission form to take with you.  
WHAT IF NEW INFORMATION IS LEARNED DURING THE STUDY THAT MIGHT AFFECT 
YOUR CHILD’S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE?  
If the researcher learns of new information in regards to this study, and it might change your 
willingness for your child to stay in this study, the information will be provided to you.  You may be 
asked to sign a new permission form if the information is provided to you after your child has 
joined the study. 
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